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Abstract 
In response to global concern for the consequences of climate change, the United Nations’ 
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) program was 
developed to support greenhouse gas emission reduction and carbon sequestration in developing 
countries. While still being developed around the world, in Nepal a REDD+ pilot project is being 
conducted with the involvement of the Nepali governme t’s Department of Forestry (DoF) and 
its community forestry program. The pilot project is called “REDD+ in Community Managed 
Forests in Nepal” (RCMFN).  The commitment of Nepal’s government to carry out this project 
makes it an ideal location to study carbon payment implementation. My study sought to 
understand the opportunities and constraints of REDD+ payment program participation by 
community forest user groups (CFUGs) enrolled in the pilot project. CFUGs are the main 
management group in Nepal’s community forestry program. Research was conducted in two 
watersheds where RCMFN operates: Kayar Khola and Charniwati. Field research was 
undertaken January-August 2012 and involved largely qualitative methods including in-depth 
interviews with government and non-government staff working on REDD+ programs and with 
executives (presidents and secretaries) of twenty six CFUGs (35% of total in the two 
watersheds).  Focus groups were held with CFUG members in each watershed to learn about 
their concerns (two focus groups in four CFUGs from each watershed). Results identified three 
sets of issues. The first involves constraints relating to the structure and requirements of global 
carbon standards and markets for community forest user group (CFUG) participation in REDD+ 
The main concerns were uncertainty regarding the program’s future and the requirement that 
funds are controlled by the DoF. The second set of issues focus on the role of NGOs and 
government partners as a link between CFUGs and global carbon markets.  Here ongoing 
conflict between priorities of the DoF (to improve forests) and CFUGs (to improve both forests 
and local socioeconomic conditions) has led to mistrust between the two groups and concern 
over control and allocation of any payments coming from REDD+. Communication between the 
RCMFN and full CFUG membership also creates challenges for CFUG knowledge and support 
of REDD+. The third set of issues relate to the capa ity of CFUGs to conduct the technical tasks 
required by REDD+ (e.g. carbon measurement, analysis, verification) as well their ability to do 
so in an efficient and equitable manner.  Despite these many concerns CFUG executives and 
members remain positive that with training and education they will be able to conduct their own 
measurements and increase their capacity for managing funds ultimately benefitting from 
opportunities from REDD+ as well as community forestry. However, to realize these 
opportunities, ongoing conflict between the DoF andCFUGs over payment control still need to 
be addressed. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
Average global temperature has steadily risen over the last several decades (IPCC 2007) 
primarily because of increased consumption of fossil fuels and land conversion; both activities 
release carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide into the atmosphere. These gasses trap solar 
radiation causing increases in temperatures across the Earth which in turn have altered weather 
patterns and intensified weather events. Collectively this process is known as climate change 
(IPCC 2007). 
The consequences of climate change have encouraged many countries to advocate for 
global policy addressing this challenge. Concern about climate induced impacts led to the 
adoption of the United Nations Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) which focuses on the 
need to reduce carbon produced from industrial activities (about 82% of CO2) and carbon from 
forest conversion (about 18 % of CO2) (Stern 2006). The Kyoto protocol to the UNFCCC was 
ratified in 1997 and was the only international trea y that regulated greenhouse gas emissions. It 
expired on December 31st 2012. In the lead up to its expiration effectively no progress was made 
towards replacing it due to disagreements over reducing industrial produced greenhouse gasses; 
however, there was concurrence on the need to address g enhouse gas emissions related to 
forest conversion. In 2007, Reducing Emissions from Forest Degradation and Deforestation 
(REDD) was adopted at the 13th UNFCCC Conference of the Parties (COP-13) in Bali.  
REDD is a forest carbon offsetting mechanism that aims to reduce carbon emissions from 
forest degradation and destruction. Its goal is “to generate a significant level of compensation or 
economic incentive to outweigh the income generated through deforestation” (FoEi 2008). In 
response to the adoption of REDD in 2007 at COP-13, the UN-REDD program, the Forest 
Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF), and an associated ssessment protocol, the Forest Inventory 
Program (FIP) where established. These organizations have pushed for the expansion of REDD 
to “REDD+” which will also cover conservation, sustainable management, and enhancement of 
carbon stocks (UNFCCC 2010). This expanded version of REDD was given the name REDD+ at 
COP-15 in 2009. The UN-REDD program and the FCPF are the multilateral REDD+ 
implementation programs. REDD+ has created global excitement (Angelsen et al. 2012); 
however, international negotiations have not reached a consensus on its institutional 
mechanisms, including financing, implementation andbenefit sharing (Angelson et al. 2012, 
Paudel & Karki 2013). 
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The World Bank created the Forest FCPF after the 2008 UNFCCC 13th Conference of the 
Parties meeting in Bali. The goal of this program is to assist developing nations in preparing to 
participate in REDD, and now REDD+ in an “economically effective and socially just” manner 
(FCPF 2013). Under the FCPF scheme, each country can design its own REDD+ implementation 
plan taking into account its unique environmental, social, and political issues (Kotru 2009). 
 
The Forest Carbon Partnership Facility assists developing countries in their efforts to 
reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation and foster conservation, 
sustainable management of forests, and enhancement of forest carbon stocks (all 
activities commonly referred to as "REDD+") by providing value to standing forests 
(FCPF 2013). 
 
The Nepal government has been a participant in the FCPF program since 2008 and is 
currently developing a REDD+ national strategy (FCP 2013). The Department of Forests (DoF) 
recognizes REDD+’s potential to combat climate change, deforestation and biodiversity loss and 
is preparing to administer REDD+ in all types of forests in Nepal. The government and national 
NGOs are particularly interested in involving community forest. In Nepal community forestry is 
based on a model similar to other countries in South Asia where forest management authority is 
transferred to registered community forest user groups (CFUG), but forest ownership remains 
with the government (Acharya 2002). Globally, community forests were initially designated on 
degraded forest lands with government expectation that management efforts would enhance 
forest sustainability while providing CFUGs with tangible economic benefits (Arnold 2001). 
Economic benefits from community forests have tended to come from access to forest products 
for home use. Under REDD+ current benefits will be augmented by payments for carbon 
sequestration (Bleaney et al. 2009). Since REDD+’s inception, inclusion of CFUGs has been of 
particular interest in Nepal because REDD+ is viewed as a mechanism to potentially increase the 
income and wellbeing of members of CFUGs through payments for carbon sequestration 
(Shrestha 2008).  
A pilot project, REDD+ in Community Managed Forests in Nepal” (RCMFN), is making 
carbon payments to CFUGs (ANSAB 2010). Media attention of REDD+ and the pilot RCMFN 
program has generated growing grass roots awareness a d interest in carbon payments. RCMFN 
was designed to be compliant with REDD+ standards for carbon monitoring and measurement 
while creating specific guidelines and testing techniques for carbon monitoring and payment 
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distribution that would meet the challenges specific to community forestry in Nepal. The project 
operates in one watershed within three of Nepal’s 75 districts: Charnawati watershed in Dolakha 
district (58 participating CFUGs); Kayar Khola watershed in Chitwan district (16 participating 
CFUGs); and Ludikhola watershed in Gorkha district (31 participating CFUGs). 
Carbon payment programs targeting CFUGs add a new dimension to the already complex 
and evolving institutional structure of CFUGs. There a e existing controversies in community 
forestry regarding ownership, management, benefit distribution across and beyond CFUGs, and 
inclusion of disadvantaged groups in CFUGs. A core issue is that the government of Nepal owns 
community forest that CFUGs manage; this structure raises issues of benefit distribution and the 
degree of autonomy of CFUGs to make management decisions independent of the Nepalese 
Department of Forests. It is unclear and hotly debated s to whether REDD+ will exacerbate 
these long standing challenges within community forestry or provide an opportunity to address 
them (Springate-Baginski & Wollenberg 2010, and Cotula & Mayers 2009). In addition 
community forest participation in REDD+ will create n w challenges for CFUGs for monitoring 
and verification of community forest carbon stocks. Furthermore, uncertainty around carbon 
market formation makes current CFUG decision making more complex (Dahal & Banskota 
2009). 
 
Research Question  
Building on the above background, this research examines: What are the opportunities 
and constraints for community forest user groups to benefit from REDD+ participation? 
 To answer this research question, the project more specifically seeks to evaluate: 
 
1)      How global carbon standards and the ongoing negotiations surrounding them offer 
opportunities and constraints for community forest user group (CFUG) participation in programs 
based on REDD+; 
2)      How each of the different actors -- CFUGs, NGOs and Nepali government employees -- 
view their roles within the development and operation of REDD+ programs in Nepal, and 
3)      The capacity of CFUGs to participate in andmanage tasks required by REDD+ in an 
effective and equitable manner. 
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Structure of the Thesis 
        The thesis consists of five chapters. Chapter 1 introduces REDD+, issues associated with 
its implementation in community forests in Nepal and the study’s major objectives.  Chapter 2 
summarizes the published and secondary literature to provide further background on REDD+, 
community forestry in Nepal, and the RCMFN project. Chapter 3 summarizes the research 
methodology used in this project and describes procedures undertaken to analyze the data.  
Chapter 4 presents the study’s major findings and Chapter 5 discusses the conclusions and 
implications for REDD+ efforts to succeed in community forests in Nepal in the future. 
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW  
This chapter provides background and prior work conducted on Reducing Emissions 
from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) and community forestry in Nepal. It pays 
particular attention to processes and dynamics regarding the interaction of these two programs, 
especially what is known about community forests that will likely impact REDD+ 
implementation in them. Given my focus on the pilot program, REDD+ in Community Managed 
Forests in Nepal (RCMFN), literature related to this effort is also summarized. 
 
 Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation and Conservation, 
Sustainable Management, and Enhancement of Carbon Stocks (REDD+) 
REDD+ is a global payment for ecosystem services mechanism designed to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions from forest degradation and destruction. Many aspects of REDD+ are 
still under negotiation. These include: what activities will be eligible for carbon payments, 
carbon baseline calculations, measurement and verification of carbon stocks, and techniques to 
conduct monitoring and verification. (Alvarado & Wertz-Kanounnikoff 2007, Angelsen 2008, 
FoEI 2008, Densham et al. 2009). Nonetheless it does have clear objectives and a designated 
work plan. A description of REDD+ and its primary challenges follows. 
 
Challenges Related to REDD and REDD+ Negotiations: 
 Since the introduction of REDD in 2007 and its expansion to REDD+ in 2009, there has 
been significant debate within the UNFCCC over how it ill be implemented. For this review, I 
separate the challenges surrounding REDD+ negotiations into two areas. The first is: REDD+ 
negotiations are tied to the broader climate negotiati ns that have been ongoing for the past 20 
years, specifically emission reductions. Virtually no progress has been made in reducing 
emissions and the negotiations have been highly contentious and political. The UN is not the 
ultimate decision maker; decisions are dependent on agreement among the 195 countries that are 
members of the UNFCC. Furthermore, the largest CO2 emitters, China and the United States, 
have been unwilling to set any limits on their emissions (Hiraldo 2011). Until an agreement can 
be reached on emissions reductions, REDD+ will not be finalized. The second challenge to 
REDD+ negotiations, and the one most pertinent to my research, involves the specifics of 
REDD+ negotiations. Those parties involved in negotiati ns come from a wide range of 
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institutions including: national governments, intergovernmental organizations, multilateral as 
well as private financial institutions, environmental organizations, research institutes and 
indigenous organizations (UNFCC 2010) and each has its own goals for what its members seek 
from REDD+. These groups agree that REDD+ is an appropriate mechanism for carbon 
mitigation, however overlapping and competing proposals for how it should be implemented 
have often left much of the policy details unfinished (Angelsen et al. 2012). More than 33 
governmental and non-governmental proposals have been submitted to the UNFCCC regarding 
REDD+ methodologies and approaches (Parker et al. 2009). These proposals range from being 
market to government funding based, and place a different focus on the importance of social and 
ecological impacts and benefits from REDD+.  Because some similarity exists among different 
groups (e.g. a focus on free market principles within developed nations; a focus on indigenous 
rights within indigenous rights organizations) they should not be viewed as monolithic blocks; 
varying views are held by organizations about different components of REDD+. 
 
How REDD+ Works: 
Below is a review of the main features of REDD+, which include funding mechanisms; 
carbon sequestration and additionality; carbon leakage; permanence of carbon storage; carbon 
base line calculation; and measurement and verification of carbon stocks. As noted above, I will 
also discuss literature that addresses interactions between REDD+ and community forestry 
efforts and the challenges for community forest user groups in Nepal to participate in REDD+ 
programs. 
 
Funding: 
Proposed funding models for REDD+ include public funds, market based approaches or a 
combination of public and market based funding (Hufty & Haakenstad 2011), however there is 
no consensus among international REDD+ negotiators on how the final system will or should 
operate. The funding models that are most likely to be adopted involve a combination of private 
and public funding. Initial investments to build capacity to implement REDD+ in community 
forests will derive from public sources with an eventual move towards a private market (Minang 
& Murphy 2010, UNFCCC 2010, Verchot & Petkova 2009). Currently, REDD+ projects operate 
at the national level with countries working with an international financing organization such as 
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the UN-REDD program (UNFCCC 2010).  I turn now to key challenges discussed in the 
literature. 
 
Carbon sequestration: 
A highly contested topic related to REDD+ includes the types of forest conservation and 
avoided degradation or destruction that REDD+ will cover. Originally, REDD only covered 
reforestation and directly avoided deforestation (Hufty & Haakenstad 2011). Currently, 
“REDD+”, an expanded version of REDD, will also cover conservation, sustainable management 
and other activities that maintain or increase forest carbon stock (UNFCCC 2010). 
 
Carbon leakage: 
A critical issue regarding REDD+ implementation is whether forest protection in one 
location shifts extraction to another location; this is referred to as "leakage" (Plantinga & 
Richards 2008). In the context of community forestry this would occur when CFUG members 
reduce resource use in their forest but increase extraction from their private land or from other 
nearby national forests to meet their household nees thus negating any overall gain in carbon 
sequestration.  
 
Permanence of carbon storage: 
Another issue related to implementation is the long-term storage of carbon. A key 
component of achieving REDD+’s goals is that the carbon sequestered remain in solid form and 
out of the atmosphere (Dutschke & Angelsen 2008). Many of the payment programs require that 
the carbon stays sequestered; 100 years is a common standard and 20 years is an absolute 
minimum (Anderson 2011). Timber can be extracted but it must be done in a manner that 
maintains carbon in solid form. For example, timber can be harvested and used in construction or 
furniture (Parker et al. 2009), but it cannot be burned. Furthermore if a forest is destroyed due to 
fire, insects or deforestation, the associated carbon credits become worthless. How to maintain 
carbon stocks is a concern (Dutshke & Angelsen 2008, Olander et al. 2009). 
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Carbon base line calculation: 
Determining the level of emissions that would occur in the absence of carbon payments is 
a challenge (Olander et al. 2007). One approach is to u e time series remote sensing data to 
determine past rates of forest loss and then to project these rates of forest loss into the future 
(Hufty & Haakenstad 2011). Plantinga and Richards (2008) argue that this approach creates 
perverse incentive that rewards countries with a history of overexploitation. In response to this 
criticism, some countries want to use forest cover levels from 10 or 20 years ago as their base 
line so they may receive credit for the gains they ave made in forest conservation (Griscom et 
al. 2009). Limited data from these time periods andreluctance from multinational players to 
expand carbon payment eligibility have created uncertainty around carbon baseline estimates 
(Karsenty 2008). 
 
Measurement and verification of carbon stocks: 
Many questions surround the issue of measurement and verification of carbon 
sequestration. The proposed mechanisms estimate how much carbon a forest contains and how 
much is added or sequestered per year. Traditionally, these calculations are based on 
measurements of trees, smaller woody vegetation and soil (Parker et al. 2009) but currently there 
are efforts to integrate remote sensing to develop an economic and rigorous protocol (Gibbs et al. 
2007). There is consensus among international REDD+ stakeholders that whatever methods are 
used to measure carbon sequestration, they should produce broad public confidence in 
measurement and verification (Verchot & Petkova 2009). The newness of REDD+, and conflicts 
between those who designed it and the people who are participating and feel they deserve benefit 
from it, have kept many components of REDD+ from being finalized (UNFCCC 2010). 
 
Critiques of REDD+ and Carbon Markets: 
REDD+ and REDD+ based programs have support and sigificant momentum from the 
UNFCCC, the UN-REDD program and the World Bank’s FCP  program. However studies raise 
concerns regarding governance, land tenure, equitable benefit distribution, and the concept of 
using free market principles, as well as the top down nature of the entire REDD+ process.  
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Governance: 
 Competence at the national level of governance, and local governance and engagement 
will be key factors in the implementation of REDD+ (Peskett et al. 2010, Muñoz-Pina et al. 
2008). Because many developing countries have poor track records for transparency and 
institutional capacity, there is concern among carbon funding organizations about proper use of 
carbon funds and technical capacity to implement payment, monitory and verification systems 
(Pesket et al. 2010). Some argue that REDD+ will improve national governance capacity 
(Orlander et al. 2009) while others doubt its ability to do so (Bullock et al. 2009). The 
development of local governance and engagement of local communities has proven key to 
successful conservation projects in the past (Muñoz-Pina et al. 2008; Agrawal et al. 2001). 
Investing in local level involvement in REDD+ implem ntation can be a positive way to avoid 
program constraints and raise prospects for the succe s of the program (Hufty & Haakenstad 
2011). 
Finally, governments seek a share of carbon payments and community groups such as 
CFUGs may be wary of recentralization of forest governance. CFUGs are not likely to relinquish 
management of forests that have taken nearly 30 years to establish (Skutsch 2005); but this is an 
issue with land tenure which I discuss next.  
 
Local people’s rights and land tenure: 
 Appropriation of land rights, especially of poor and i digenous peoples is another 
concern related to REDD+ (Griffiths 2007, Peskett et al. 2010). Land must be properly 
demarcated as part of the forest measurement process under REDD+ and this requirement has 
been theorized to lead to formulization or erosion of current land rights that are not well defined 
(Flunder 2009, TNC 2009, Bond et al. 2009). Furthermore Griffiths (2007) point out that 
REDD+ can also lead to loss of traditional local or indigenous access rights to forest that are 
entirely government and managed owned. 
 
Equity: 
 There is considerable concern regarding who actually will control and benefit from 
REDD+ payments.  Some question whether benefits from REDD+ will be appropriated by the 
elites which has been the case in other development and conservation mechanisms (Fritzen 
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2007). Concerns over elite appropriation have lead Sommerville et al. (2009) to argue that if 
equitable carbon payment distribution is not considere  it may undermine REDD+ projects. 
Another concern is that the added value REDD+ will increase the economic value of community 
forests and make them more vulnerable to appropriation (Cotula 2009). Local communities may 
also be priced out of participation. The high cost of forest carbon monitoring and transaction 
costs related to carbon sale casts doubt on whether local villagers can participate, and in an 
economical way (Adhikari 2005, Bond et al. 2009).  
 
Appropriateness of market driven solutions: 
A central assumption of carbon markets is that bringing what is now an economic 
externality of land conversion into the market calculation is the best way to encourage forest 
protection, regeneration and expansion. The measurement matrix of free market capitalism (e.g. 
gross national product) is notorious for not taking e vironmental externalities into account, and 
some suggest it plays a large role in many current environmental crises including climate change. 
Some critics question why turning to market mechanisms appear to be the answer rather than 
other approaches that focus on root causes of changing climate (Stavinst 1997). Carbon trading 
does not target and work to change the root cause of climate change which is the global increase 
in burning of fossil fuels.  
 
Top down implementation: 
Due to the structure of large development organizations such as USAID, other bilateral 
donor agencies and UNDP, and the financial cost and resources required to undertake 
development projects, most projects are developed at the national or international level. As a 
consequence of being administered through these high level authorities, many development and 
conservation projects are structured in a top down fashion. REDD+ and the World Bank’s FCPF 
program in Nepal is following this top down trend (Bushley & Khatri 2011). This is likely to 
result in projects that are not appropriately adapted to local conditions and local people’s needs 
and concerns may be ignored as is common in conventional development programs (Chambers 
1983). The top down and external creation of most projects means that local people are unlikely 
to develop a sense of ownership over the project and may even accumulate feelings of antipathy 
towards them (Escobar 1995). To address these issues, a more inclusive and participatory style is 
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advocated. Easterly (2002) envisions an approach based on locally identified needs and 
generated ideas in partnership with outside experts and local participation in pre- and post-
evaluation. While these ideas are discussed in REDD+ and REDD+ project documentation in 
Nepal, limited evidence exists that they have been implemented (Bushley & Khatri 2011).   
 
Section summary:  
While many of the components of REDD+ are still under negotiation, there is a large and 
growing literature on REDD+ which suggest both its opportunities and constraints. Many of the 
latter could raise problems for REDD+ implemented in smaller scale forests administered by 
local managers. Yet there is growing interest in applying REDD+ at these smaller scales. 
Proponents of community forestry see the overarching goals of REDD+ including combating 
climate change, biodiversity protection, and poverty alleviation as consistent with the current 
goals of community forestry which emphasize local environmental protection, income 
generation, and resource conservation (Bushley & Khatri 2011; Hufty & Haakenstad 2011). 
Given that REDD+ will be implemented within the framework of the existing community 
forestry program it is important to understand current challenges within community forestry 
(Barr & Sayer 2012, Staddon 2009).  
 
Community Forestry in Nepal 
In Nepal existing conditions and institutions will shape REDD+ so it is imperative to 
understand the history and evolving dynamics of community forestry in Nepal. (Dahal & 
Banskota 2009).  
 
History of Community Forestry: 
Community forestry in Nepal is a rediscovery of community level management that was 
in existence in many parts of the country prior to the mid-1950s (Gautam et al. 2004). In 1957 
the Nepalese government nationalized its forests replacing local management with a centralized, 
scientific forest management system administered by the Department of Forests (DoF). Due to 
Nepal’s mountainous topography and lack of roads and financial resources, the DoF was not able 
to effectively manage this vast forest system (Dev & Adhikari 2007). The result was widespread 
uncontrolled and unsustainable forest use that degra d and destroyed forests (Gautam et al. 
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2004). Movements seeking local recontrol of forests for improving livelihoods, cultural survival, 
and political representation were encouraged by international NGO presence (e.g. the FORD 
Foundation). Gradually the concept of a modern, state driven community program emerged and 
in 1978, the Forest Act of 1961was amended to establi h the rudiments of community forestry 
(Kanel 2006, Gautam et al. 2004). This act gave local communities increasing management 
autonomy, but not legal ownership nor total autonomy f the Panchayat Forests. The Panchayat 
was the smallest unit of local governance in Nepal. A decade later the 25-year Master Plan for 
the Forestry Sector, 1989 laid the groundwork for the Forestry Act of 1993, which established 
community forests (Gautam et al. 2004). Nepali NGOs such as the Federation of Community 
Forestry Users, Nepal (FECOFUN) actively advocate for reforming old polices and developing 
new policy that favors community forestry (Kanel 2006). In addition to community forests, 
leasehold forests were established. Lease hold forests are small patches of government forests 
that are handed over to groups of poor households on forty year leases. The leaseholders are 
allowed to manage these forests for household use (Kanel 2006). 
Nepal’s Forest Department formally allocates forest land to CFUGs. A CFUG is an 
association of rural households from an area near a forest that joins together to participate 
together and with the DoF in planning, establishing, managing and protecting a local forest 
(Gautam et al. 2004). CFUGs are required to draft a constitution and formulate a management 
that is submitted to the DoF for approval. The CFUG makes rules regarding forest access and 
resource harvest that restricts and manages use of th forest. Ideally these plans result in 
improvement of community forests conditions, provide access of CFUG members to community 
forest products. Members can request permits to harvest fuel wood, animal fodder, medicinal 
plants, wild food, and timber. The off sale of forest products is usually restricted to the CFUG. 
Income generated from these sales as well as the collecti n of fees for membership and 
harvesting permits is an important component of most CFUGs. Local people value managing 
their forests sustainably because they know the consequences of unsustainable management and 
have an understanding of ecological services that he lt y forests provide (Arnold 2001).   
Within the DoF there was initial resistance to community forestry, but gradually 
government forest officers embraced community forestry. Currently CFUGs are in every district 
of Nepal (Gautam et al. 2004). Spielman (2010) report d that 14,439 CFUGs cover 1,229,669 ha 
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or about 25 % of Nepal’s forests and 1,659,775 households or about 32 % of Nepal’s population 
were members of these organizations.  
Community forests have had significant successes in reversing deforestation while still 
providing economic benefits to local people, improving local institutional capacity, increasing 
resource access, and improving local ecological conditi s (Gautam et al. 2004, Yadav et al. 
2003). These achievements have made Nepal’s community forestry program one of the most 
successful in the world (Gautam et al. 2004, Springate-Baginski 1998). However these successes 
have not occurred uniformly in community forests across Nepal and there are significant 
challenges that community forestry still faces (Gautam et al. 2004); many which have relevance 
for their involvement with REDD+ programs. 
 
Current Challenges within Community Forestry:  
Existing problems in Nepali society have been carried over into community forestry. For 
example, power disparities between women and men and a lack of well-educated people in rural 
areas have led to continued gender inequality and a lack of institutional capacity in CFUGs. 
Efforts to address some of these issues (e.g. inclusion of poor members and women in CFUG 
management) have had success in some places (Forest 2003, Varughese & Ostrom 2001). 
Community forestry has been more successful in the Middle Hills of Nepal compared to 
the Terai (or lowland areas of Nepal). Although the Terai region has 31.5% of Nepal’s forested 
lands and 48% of the population, it only contains 4.4% of registered CFUGs and 6.6% of total 
CFUG lands (Gautam et al. 2004). The primary reason for lack of CFUGs in the Terai is 
government unwillingness to hand over these forests here. Illegal harvesting of timber by 
CFUGs, greater ethnic heterogeneity, easier access to markets and high value of the forest 
resources have been noted as reasons for lack of handover (Kanel 2006, Gautam et al. 2004).  
In addition to regional variation in the success of c mmunity forestry implementation, 
other broad issues have been identified throughout Nepal. These include equity in resource 
distribution and the inclusion of disadvantaged groups in CFUG decisions, conflict between 
CFUGs and the DoF, benefit distribution between areas with access to forests and those without 
nearby forests, and challenges with implementation of modern forestry practices. 
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Equity and the inclusion of disadvantaged groups: 
Equitable distribution of CFUG income and forest resources among CFUG members is 
an issue of concern at all levels in Nepal. Within t e laws governing community forestry there 
are provisions that require CFUG income to be invested in pro-poor activities (Kanel & Kandel 
2004).  However there is extensive documentation of elite capture and corruption within CFUGs 
due to elite domination of CFUG governing structures (Thoms 2008). Elite control of decision 
making structures is further compounded because poor CFUG members are also less likely to be 
engaged in CFUG decision making (Kanel 2006, Kotru 2009, Thoms 2008). Elite members tend 
to favor resource conservation over management and distribution of resources (Thoms 2008). 
While elites are able to afford alternatives to the resources available in the forest, poorer 
households are not (Thoms 2008). Elite members are also not as dependent on the forest for 
additional income. Charcoal production and the outside ale of fuelwood have been banned in 
many CFUGs removing a key source of income from very poor members (Putz 
2009). Furthermore Nightingale (2002) points out that even when women or people of lower cast 
have the opportunity to speak their voice at CFUG meetings it does not necessarily translate into 
influencing decision making. 
 
CFUG and DoF conflict: 
An enduring issue in community forestry in Nepal has been disagreement between 
CFUGs and the government over each side’s rights and responsibilities (Thoms 2008, Gautam et 
al. 2004). As noted above, the Nepali government remains the forest land owner and is the final 
decision making authority over how the forests and its particular forest products can be used and 
managed. Permanence of forest rights has been a major concern to CFUG members who have, in 
some cases, invested decades of time and energy into improving and protecting their forests 
(Gautam et al. 2004). The government of Nepal was reluctant to hand over degraded land to 
adjacent communities at the inception of community forestry and now that some of these forests 
have become increasingly valuable, there is significant desire on the part of the DoF to exert 
more control over this land and the revenues generated from these forests (Paudel et al. 2012). In 
1999, the Forestry Act of 1993 was amended to requi 25% of CFUG income to be invested in 
forest development and in 2012 increased taxation of the off sale of forest products and greater 
DoF oversight were proposed (Dahal & Banskota 2009). 
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In addition to unresolved issues related to increased taxation and oversight, debate also 
exists over the basic goals of community forestry. Thoms (2008) points out that this dates to 
some of the founding policy on community forestry in Nepal. The1988 Master Plan states that 
community forests were meant to meet the essential needs of CFUG members; in contrast, the 
Forest Act of 1993 asserts that CFUGs have the right to manage forests for both substance and 
commercial purposes. Some DoF staff are still opposed to CFUG investment in “community 
development” (Thoms 2008, Kanel 2006); however, these types of investments are often 
recognized as principal benefits of community forestry (Kanel & Kandel 2004). 
 
Benefit distribution among members and non-members of CFUGs: 
Lack of access to existing community forests or forest land eligible for CFUG 
management is a common issue especially pertinent i the Terai (lowland areas of Nepal) (Kanel 
2006). Indigenous Terai ethnic groups (inhabiting lowlands) believe they have been historically 
dominated in the National government by the hill peo l s. Furthermore, in many places in the 
lowlands, the land available for community forests i  adjacent to locations where the last wave of 
hill migrants settled (Kanel 2006). Consequently, traditional ethnic groups of the Terai perceive 
community forestry predominately benefit recent setlers from the hills.  
 
Implementation of modern forestry practices: 
The Forestry Act of 1993 requires each CFUG to prepar  an operational plan, which 
includes a forest inventory and a user group constitution; additionally, the operational plan must 
be updated every five years. A component of the operational plan is a forest inventory that 
measures forest biomass and recruitment. Many CFUGs cannot complete these inventories 
without assistance from the DoF and many local DoF offices lack the personnel and resources to 
assist with these inventories. This backlog has left many CFUGs operating without their legally 
required management plans (Kanel 2006).  
Furthermore, active forest management and establishment of optimal harvesting rates are 
new concepts to many CFUGs. Reluctance by CFUGs to implement modern forest management 
techniques for fear of destroying the forest has led many CFUGs to avoid optimally managing 
their forests (Yadav 2003, Kanel 2006). Members of Nepal’s community forests need to be 
trained in forest management techniques but the process of transferring technical forestry 
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practices into local forestry knowledge is slow due to the decentralized nature of community 
forestry in Nepal (Kanel 2006). Nightingale (2005) suggests that modern forestry management 
may not meet the objectives of CFUGs that are more interested in ecological services and 
traditional forest use that community forests provide.  
 
Section summary: 
Currently, only a few pilot carbon payment projects have made or anticipate making 
payments to community forests in Nepal (ANSAB 2010). As a consequence, the long term 
viability and broad applicability of these types of projects is still in doubt (Peskett et al. 2010). 
Community forests that originated prior to the widespread recognition of climate change are 
natural initial targets for REDD+. Many of the goals of CF programs and REDD+ are similar; 
however, how the existing challenges within community forestry interplay with issues within 
REDD+ will shape the feasibility of REDD+ program iplementation and affect potential 
benefits to participants. 
 
Community Forestry and REDD+ in Nepal 
Existing problems within community forestry and Nepal will most likely carry over to 
REDD+ unless these issues are specifically addressed. Some of the issues associated with 
implementation are unique to REDD+, however, many will also relate to existing challenges in 
community forestry and Nepal. Benefit distribution a d inclusion of disadvantaged groups are 
current challenges within community forestry that will likely impact the  implementation of 
REDD+. REDD+ will also create new management challenges such as carbon related forest 
measurement, verification, carbon accounting, data analysis, and technical capacity building to 
manage REDD+.  
According to the literature, the primary opportunities and constraints of implementing a 
carbon monitoring system in Nepal’s community forests include the following which I will 
discuss in more detail in following sections.  
Constraints: The following have been identified as factors that m y limit implementation 
of REDD+ in Nepal: benefit sharing, equitable resource distribution among people who do not 
live near any forest, inclusion of disadvantaged groups, collaborative participation in REDD+ 
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implementation, uncertainty around carbon markets, and verification, carbon accounting, forest 
measurement, data analysis and other technical aspects of REDD+. 
Opportunities: These issues have been identified as positive factors that will result from 
REDD+ implementation: inevitability of carbon markets, pro-ecosystem services, biodiversity 
and climate change mitigation, financial benefits and help addressing longstanding issues in 
community forestry.  
 
Constraints: 
Carbon payment distribution: 
Given current concerns over equity issues in community forestry, it is likely that conflict 
over distribution of community forest funds will increase as CFUGs begin to receive additional 
economic benefits in the form of carbon payments (Dhital 2009). 
 
Resource distribution for people not living near a forest:                                                                                                                                                                  
Increased taxation on community forests has been proposed as a method to distribute 
CFUG benefits to people without access to nearby forests or to a CFUG group to join. Benefit 
redistribution is especial pertinent in the Terai because lowland forests have the potential to be 
highly valuable in carbon markets and over 90% of the population in this area does not have a 
CF group (Bleaney et al. 2009) because of reticence o  the part of the DoF to handover forests 
(Kanel 2006, Gautam et al. 2004). This issue affects all CFUGs in Nepal because Terai based 
political parties have been major supporters of the most recent legislation attempting to change 
the 1993 Forestry Act. This law is the legal basis for community forestry.  Lack of access to 
community forests or alternative benefits from them has created a powerful ally of Terai based 
parties for those who wish to take power and money from the CFUGs ( i.e. members of the 
Department of Forests and those attempting to expand legal and illegal timber harvest) (Paudel et 
al. 2012). Inability to provide benefits to people without community forest access is likely to 
increase when community forests receive carbon payments (Dahal & Banskota 2009).  
 
Equity and the inclusion of disadvantaged groups: 
Nepal’s official position on REDD+ at UNFCCC negotiations emphasized the 
importance of including disadvantaged groups that depend on forest resources in REDD+ 
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planning (Bleaney et al. 2009). One risk REDD+ participation poses for disadvantaged groups is 
that CFUGs may favor management regimes that favor carbon sequestration at the expense of 
other uses that are essential for poorer CFUG member livelihoods (Bleaney et al. 2009). Also 
poor users are less likely to be engaged in CFUG decision making and have less influence over 
those decisions when they do participate. Restrictions on the sale of fuelwood and charcoal 
production have already occurred under existing CFUG management regimes thus removing a 
key source of income for poor CFUG members (Thoms 2008, Putz 2009). While restrictions on 
forest use has been an essential part of CF restoration, further tightening of restrictions to 
enhance potential carbon earnings will likely put the most pressure on poor CFUG members who 
often are not the main beneficiaries of CFUG expenditures (Thoms 2008).  
 
Collaborative participation in REDD+ implementation: 
CFUG participation is designed into Nepal’s REDD+ implementation strategy; however, 
an important concern is whether or not participation will be meaningful (Bleaney et al. 2009). 
The FCPF and the UN-REDD program have advocated for national standardization across 
participating countries and Nepal has worked toward conforming its readiness strategy to the 
blue print provided by these organizations. Thus, many of the rules regarding REDD+ have 
already been decided at the international level leaving little opportunity to adapt REDD+ to local 
conditions (Dahal & Banskota 2009, McDermott et al. 2013). In Nepal, the Department of 
Forests in turn collaborates primarily with national level community forestry NGOs (Bushley & 
Khatri 2011). Although many of these NGOs advocate for consultation with CFUGs, user group 
members have had little input (Bushley & Khatri 2011). Finally, without education about 
REDD+, CFUG members would have difficulty participat ng in planning for carbon payment 
implementation (Bleaney et al. 2009). 
 
Technical aspects of REDD+: 
Nepal is in the process of establishing country specific carbon accounting and verification 
standards. Currently, REDD+ regulations require intr ational third party verifiers. This is 
problematic because the high cost of international verifiers will erode the potential profits a 
CFUG would receive from participating in REDD+ (Larr zábal et al. 2012). Furthermore, 
CFUGs in Nepal do not have the skills or knowledge ne ded to conduct the measurements and 
 
 
19 
 
data analysis required to calculate forest carbon (Ka el 2006). This issue is exacerbated by out 
migration for urban and international employment (Seddon et al. 2002). Significant investments 
still need to be made to develop a national carbon payment infrastructure and to prepare CFUGs 
to participate in carbon payments.  
Another challenge CFUGs face is their small size; th  median area of these forests is < 80 
hectors (Kanel & Kandel 2004). Many of the costs of measurement and verification are fixed, 
limiting CFUG profitability. Furthermore, their size makes them unattractive to carbon investors 
who are more interested in large projects (Dahal & Banskota 2009). Technical structure of 
forming REDD+ cooperatives or other marketing techniques to overcome these issues are under 
development (ANSAB 2010). 
There are concerns around CFUG participation in carbon payment programs because 
carbon payments are intended as an incentive for curbing deforestation or increasing carbon 
stocks in existing forests and it may be difficult to increase carbon stocks in community forests 
that are already sustainably managed (Bushley & Khatri 2011, Dahal & Bankskota 2009). This is 
especially an issue in the middle hills where efforts to curb deforestation have been most 
successful (Bushley & Khatri 2011). Over 90 percent of CFUGs are located in the Middle Hills 
raising concerns that most CFUGs in Nepal will eithr be ineligible for carbon payments or will 
not be able to generate significant income from them (Dahal & Banskota 2009).  
Finally, change in forest management in Nepal as seen in its embracing of community 
forestry reflects a trend observed throughout South Asia whereby forest governance has shifted 
from a top down, centralized system, to a participatory decentralized one (Phelps et al. 2010). 
Carbon payments could reverse this trend to a certain degree. Bushley and Khatri (2011) have 
raised concerns that payments may weaken local management authority and provide incentives 
to re-centralise forestry in Nepal by forcing participating CFUGs to work under a government 
managed system with little ability to provide input into its operation. 
 
 Opportunities: 
Popularity of carbon market strategy: 
While many unknowns exist surrounding carbon markets and their creation, there is 
consensus among scientists that carbon sequestration is an essential component to combating 
global climate change (Parker et al. 2009). Today mrket based approaches to conservation are 
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emphasized. For example, the only components of global climate policy to be approved by the 
UN are mandatory and voluntary markets operating around the world. Furthermore, REDD+ is 
being implemented in several test countries, including Nepal based on a market approach (Dahal 
& Banskota 2009). For these reasons it is likely that some type of global carbon market will 
develop. 
 
Pro-ecosystem services, biodiversity and climate change: 
The UNFCCC has stated that REDD+ has the potential to ddress several of the major 
problems affecting Nepal by providing money for thepoor, reduce climate change impacts and 
protect and enhance biodiversity (UNFCCC 2010). However, although these co-benefits appear 
very positive, past experiences, especially with clean development mechanisms, have shown that 
these types of co-benefits often fail to materialize (Staddon 2009). 
 
Financial benefit: 
The global carbon market is estimated to be worth tens of billions in U.S. dollars (Point 
Carbon 2011). A significant amount of these funds will be available for carbon mitigation under 
a UN/World Bank sponsored programs for the restoration of destroyed and degraded forests. 
Thus CFUGs in Nepal and similar groups everywhere have an incentive to participate in carbon 
markets because involvement could potentially provide significant extra income (Peskett et al. 
2010). Furthermore, extra income generated from forest conservation will not necessarily alter 
existing forest product collection such as non-timber forest product collection and the sale of 
timber for construction and manufacturing (Anderson 2011). The income provided by 
sequestration payments may help meet short term economic needs that otherwise would have 
been met by intensive and unsustainable extraction (Bleaney et al. 2009).  Nepal is a very poor 
country and there are many basic services in all parts of Nepal that go unmet for lack of money. 
This limitation puts significant pressure on CFUGs to provide where the government cannot and 
it is still a question as to whether carbon payments will provide enough financial incentive to 
reduce timber harvest. 
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Address longstanding issues in community forestry:  
REDD+ faces many challenges in Nepal but it also provides an opportunity to address 
many of the structural issues that have emerged as community forestry has matured (Dahal & 
Banskota 2009). For REDD+ to operate effectively, si vicultural and administrative capacity will 
need to be built at all levels of the forestry sector. The influx of funds to help develop this 
capacity, if used correctly, has the potential to benefit both current DoF management objectives 
as well as prepare CFUGs to participate in carbon and other emerging ecosystem service 
payment schemes. DoF staff, CFUG members and executiv s will require training and education, 
and marginalized CFUG members will need to be included in the decision making process 
(Dahal & Banskota 2009). Furthermore, the program hs potential to help improve tenure 
security, sustainable management of forest resources, benefit sharing, and revenues (Dahal & 
Banskota 2009).  
Although there is significant literature on the theoretical opportunities and constraints of 
CFUG participation in REDD+ based programs, there is limited research on existing REDD+ 
projects due to their recent implementation. The only project in Nepal that is implementing a 
REDD+ based carbon payment program is RCMFN. Research conducted on this project, 
including my own, will be some of the first work to assess how REDD+ and the issues 
surrounding it operate in Nepal.  
 
REDD+ in Community Managed Forests in Nepal (RCMFN) 
 While conducting preliminary research, I found one project in Nepal that was making 
carbon payment to CFUG, REDD+ in Community Managed Forests Nepal (RCMFN). My first 
goal in Nepal was to determine if any other carbon payment projects existed. After concluding 
my initial interviews in Kathmandu I determined no other large scale projects were present and I 
decided to focus my research in areas where RCMFN was functioning. There is limited 
information written on this project.  This section is based on a project summary document titled: 
Forest Carbon Stock of CFUG in three Watersheds (Ludikhola, Kayar Khola and Charnawati) 
and written by a project staff person (ANSAB 2010).  
 The RCMFN project was funded by the Norwegian Development Corporation (Norad). 
The project is implemented by three NGOs: International Centre for Integrated Mountain 
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Development (ICIMOD), the Asia Network for Sustainable Agriculture and Bioresources 
(ANSAB) and he Federation of community Forestry Users Nepal (FECOFUN).  
 RCMFN was designed to be compliant with REDD+ standards for carbon monitoring and 
measurement while at the same time creating specific guidelines and testing techniques for 
carbon monitoring and payment distribution that would meet the challenges specific to 
community forestry in Nepal. An example of this arep otocols for carbon measurement which I 
discuss below. 
 RCMFN’s approach to carbon market participation for CFUGs is to group the forests into 
larger forest blocks to create economies of scale for measuring and monitoring the forests as well 
as to overcome the marketing limitations of small forests. Under this arrangement all of the 
participating CFUGs would collectively share the cost f forest measurement and verification.  
This proposed method has popular support for overcoming issue of scale (Skutsch 2012). The 
grouping for RCMFN is delineated by watershed boundaries which incorporate several CFUGs. 
These CFUGs are treated as one large forest for sampling purposes, however, RCMFN staff 
work with each CFUG individually to measure and monitor their forests carbon sequestration 
and each forest receives payments based on their for sts size.  
Forest plots are randomly selected for measurement throughout the forest sample area, 
with at least one plot placed in each community forest. Community forest boundaries are 
demarcated and measured by teams of CFUG members led by RCMFN technical experts. The 
first measurements, made in 2010, were used to establish a baseline for measuring forest carbon. 
Two subsequent rounds of carbon monitoring followed in 2011 and 2012 with corresponding 
payments for sequestered carbon. Forest measurement data as well as leaf litter and soil samples 
are sent to Kathmandu for analysis and carbon measur ment. Starting in 2012, leasehold forests 
were added to the project’s monitoring scope (Joshi 2011).  
 Due to the large numbers of researchers and project staff that need to repeatedly travel to 
the study sites from Kathmandu it was necessary to cho se places that were easy to access. 
Dolakha, Chitwan and Gorkha district are all within 5 hours of Kathmandu. Chitwan is the 
closest district to Kathmandu that is located in Nepal’s lowlands and contains forests that are 
distinct to those areas. Gorkha and Dolakha are two of the most accessible hill and mountain 
districts from Kathmandu. Once these districts were s l cted, a team of people was sent to each 
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district to work with district forest officers and local government personnel to collaboratively 
select which watershed within each district to implement the project.  
Charnawati watershed, Dolakha district (fifty eight participating CFUGs) is located in the 
Central Development Region of Nepal and is predominately hilly. Its altitude ranges from 835m-
3549m and covers 14,037 hectares, 5,996 of which are under CFUG management. The fifty eight 
CFUGs are made up of 10,270 households with a total p pulation of 48,504. The average CFUG 
income in Chitwan district was 30 thousand NPR ($ 375) (Nepal DoF CFUG summary 
statistics). 
Kayar Khola watershed, Chitwan district (sixteen participating CFUGs) is located in the 
Central Development Region of Nepal and is a large low valley that opens onto the flat plains or 
Terai. Its altitude ranges from 245m-1944m and covers 8,002 hectares, with 2,381 under CFUG 
management. The sixteen CFUGs are composed of 3,935households with an estimated 
population of 22,090. The average CFUG income in Chitwan district was 2.6 million NPR ($ 
32,500) (Nepal DoF CFUG summary statistics). 
Ludikhola watershed, Gorkha district (thirty one participating CFUGs) is located in the 
Western Development Region of Nepal and is predominately hilly. Its altitude ranges from 
318m-3549m and covers 5750 hectares, 1888 of which are under CFUG management. The thirty 
one CFUGs are made up of 3800 households with a population of 23,197. The average CFUG 
income in Gorkha district was thirteen thousand NPR ($163) (Nepal DoF CFUG summary 
statistics). 
One of the central components of the RCMFN project is to include CFUG's in its design 
and implementation so that RCMFN may provide a successful blue print for future carbon 
payments programs. To achieve this goal, three regional and one national level working group 
were established. The regional working groups are composed of two representatives, one man 
and one woman, from each CFUG. The national level group is made of members from the 
regional groups. Through this system concerns and ideas about the project are passed from 
CFUG to RCMFN staff and from staff back to the CFUG.  
Carbon payments are made to the regional working groups that represent each of the 
participating watersheds. These groups distribute the money based on amount of carbon each 
CFUG has sequestered the previous year and several other socioeconomic factors. These include 
the number of poor and indigenous members in each CFUG as well as budgetary pledges to 
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invest a set amount of carbon payments into pro sequestration forest management. The 
component of the payment distribution system designed to give extra benefit to CFUGs with 
greater number of poor and indigenous groups is specific to the RCMFN project and was not 
directly addressed in my research.  
 
Section summary: 
 RCMFN was designed as a pilot program for REDD+ and operates in one watershed in 
each of three districts. Two of the districts are in the mountains and one is in the lowlands. 
RCMFN introduces the concept of carbon payments to CFUGs, sets up a measurement and 
verification system in their forests, and makes carbon payments to them. 
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CHAPTER 3. METHODS 
Introduction: 
This study was conducted through a largely qualitative methodology which sought to 
explain community forest participation in REDD+ prog ams through in depth investigation 
rather than through testing of hypotheses. A qualitative approach is recommended when the topic 
is new, as is my focus on REDD+ implementation in Nepal, and also when the purpose of the 
research is to identify preliminary insights into a phenomena (Patton 2005), An empirical 
approach was chosen because much of the existing work focused on theoretical constraints to 
participation such as: benefit sharing, inclusion of disadvantaged groups, collaborative 
participation in REDD+ implementation, uncertainty around carbon payment implementation 
(Dhital 2009, Bleaney et al. 2009 and Bushley & Khatri 2011) as well as issues surrounding 
government and NGO implementation using limited data from practitioners working to 
implement REDD+ in particular forests. 
To examine the opportunities and constraints regarding the participation of Nepal’s 
community forestry user groups in REDD+, I will focus on three sets of actors and actions which 
I suggest are critical to answer my research question: 1) NGO, which in this context is REDD+ 
in Community Managed Forests in Nepal (RCFNM) project and other Nepali NGO’s working on 
community forestry and REDD+; 2) Nepali government officials, especially in the REDD+ 
Forestry and Climate Change Cell (REDD Cell) and others working on community forestry and 
REDD+, within the Department of Forests (DoF); and 3) members and leaders, especially CFUG 
presidents, of CFUGs that are participating in the RCMFN project. In addition to learning about 
characteristics and concerns at each level, I sought to understand interactions across these levels 
to learn how they functioned together, or not, to enact carbon payment program participation for 
CFUGs. Also before initiating my research in Nepal, I conducted library and internet background 
research on community forestry and carbon payments in Nepal. 
I conducted a preliminary set of interviews with NGO and government agencies working 
on carbon payments in community forests to gain a contextual understanding of REDD+ in 
community forestry and to determine the most pertinnt actors at each level, (Fig 2) Step 1. From 
these interviews I discovered that the RCMFN project and the government REDD Cell were 
where I wanted to focus my government and NGO interviews. I then conducted introductory 
interviews at these organizations, (Fig 1), Steps 2A and 2B and used the information from these 
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interviews to inform my CFUG level interviews, (Fig 1), steps 3A and 3B. The CFUG interviews 
in turn informed my concluding interviews with the RCMFN project and the government REDD 
Cell, (Fig 4), steps 4A and 4B. At the beginning of each section describing these steps Figure 1 
will be referenced to help keep the reader oriented. 
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Figure 1. Summary of three actors and data collection. 
 
 
 
 
28 
 
Currently the Nepal government is implementing a REDD+ preparedness program but is 
not yet conducting carbon measurement, analysis or making payments to CFUG’s. To assess 
CFUG participation in REDD+ and what it might be like for them to participate in an eventual 
national REDD+ program I worked with CFUGs participat ng in RCMFN. 
The RCMFN project operates in three of Nepal’s seventy-five districts. In each of these 
districts they identified one watershed to work within. All of the CFUGs within these three 
watersheds participate in the project. Two of the districts, Gorkha and Dolakha were located in 
the middle hills (1000 – 4000 m), and the third, Chitwan, was located in the lowlands ( < 1000 m 
). From my preliminary interviews with NGO and government personnel and Kanel (2006), I 
learned that community forestry in the Terai and midle hills is very different so I decided to 
conduct work in the lowland site, Chitwan, and one f the middle hill locations (Fig. 2). In the 
Terai there is much higher abundance of high value timber and CFUG handover has been more 
limited (Gautum et al. 2004). I chose only one of the middle hill locations because of time and 
logistics. RCMFN staff recommended I study Dolakha over Gorkha because of accessibility and 
access to technical support. In Chitwan district, RCMFN operates in the Kayar Khola watershed 
and all sixteen CFUGs participate (Fig 3). In Dolakh  district, RCMFN staff work in Charnawati 
watershed and all fifty eight CFUGs participate (Fig 4). A description who I interviewed at those 
CFUGs is in the sections on CFUG level analysis. 
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Figure 2. Map of Nepal showing two study areas. 
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Figure 3. Kayar Khola watershed in Chitwan district, Nepal (ICIMOD et al. 2011). 
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Figure 4. Charnawati watershed in Dolakha district, Nepal (ICIMOD et al. 2011). 
 
 
Study Site Context: 
Kayar Khola watershed, Chitwan district (sixteen CFUGs) is located in the Central 
Development Region of Nepal and is a large low valley that opens onto the flat plains or Terai 
(Fig 2). Its altitude ranges from 245 m-1944 m and covers 8,002 ha, with 2,381 under CFUG 
management. The sixteen CFUGs are composed of 3,935households with an estimated 
population of 22,090. The average CFUG income in Chitwan district was 2.6 million NPR ($ 
32,500) (Nepal DoF CFUG summary statistics). Kayar Khola watershed is situated about one 
hour east of Baratpur and Narangard municipalities. Baratpur is Chitwan district’s headquarters 
and Narangard is the largest city in the district; the latter is located on the main highway that 
connects the lowlands of Nepal to Kathmandu which is a 4-5 hour drive from this lowland urban 
center. Members of the CFUG that are located in the southern half of the watershed have 
relatively easy access to markets and educational opportunities including the university level. 
Narangard is known for having some of the best univers ties in Nepal and is a major 
transportation hub. However, some of the CFUGs in this district are a day’s walk from the 
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nearest road and lack easy access to markets or education beyond grammar school. The 
landscape is more homogeneous than that in Charniwati and is fragmented into large agricultural 
blocks in the valleys and forest blocks in the surro nding hills. Most members can obtain all the 
forest resources they need from their CFUG. The CFUGs are predominately naturally 
regenerated forests with large quantities of highly valuable hardwood timber.  
Charnawati watershed, Dolakha district (fifty eight participating CFUGs) is located in the 
Central Development Region of Nepal, (Fig 4) and unlike Chitwan, is predominately hilly. Its 
altitude ranges from 835 m-3549 m and covers 14,037 ha, 5,996 of which are under CFUG 
management. The fifty eight CFUGs are composed of 10,270 households with a total population 
of 48,504. The average CFUG income in Dolakha district was thirty thousand NPR ($375) 
(Nepal DoF CFUG summary statistics). Charniwati watershed is situated adjacent to Charikot 
municipality which is Dolakha’s district headquarters. Charikot is the largest city in the district 
and sits on the main highway to Kathmandu which is 4-5 hours drive. Similar to Chitwan, 
members of CFUGs that are close to Charikot, or the main highway, have relatively easy access 
to markets and educational opportunities including the university level. However, some of the 
CFUGs are a day’s walk from the nearest road and lack e sy access to market or education 
beyond grammar school. The landscape is heterogeneous with many small CFUGs intermixed 
with farmland. Some of the larger CFUGs provide their members with all the forest resources 
they need but many of the smaller CFUGs supply their users with only a fraction of what is 
required. Consequently in these areas of the watershed, users are often members of multiple 
CFUGs and usually have differing rights within these users groups depending on what they have 
access to in the other CFUG in which they are members. The CFUGs in Charnawati are also 
predominately pine plantations which is considered a problem because they lack the diversity of 
plant species that is valued for the variety of resources provided beyond timber and fuelwood. 
These CFUGs also lack valuable hardwood timber. 
 
Preliminary Interviews 
I began in Kathmandu by interviewing staff of NGOs and members of Nepal’s 
government who were working on carbon payments in community forests, (Fig 1), Step 1. I 
chose to start here because I was new to working in Nepal and needed to obtain a basic 
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understanding of the existing carbon payment and community forestry programs in the country 
and the context within which they were operating.  
I selected the NGOs and government organizations to interview using the referral 
sampling method which started with a list of organiz tions and individuals working on carbon 
payments and community forestry in Nepal that was provided by two key informants: Dr. 
Keshav Kanel, former Director of Forestry, who worked in community forestry for many years 
and Dr. Narayan Shrestha, founder of FECOFUN (Federation of Community Forest Users 
Nepal), the largest and most influential CFUG organiz tion in Nepal. FECOFUN represents 
CFUGs at the national level and provides technical support at the local level; it represents over 
14,000 of Nepal’s 16,000 CFUGs. When an individual w s recommended by my key informants, 
or someone they had recommended, I arranged an interview with that person. When an 
organization was recommended, I contacted that organization by telephone and explained I was 
interested in community forestry and carbon payments a d asked who would be the best person 
to talk to about that topic at that organization. 
The government and NGO members I interviewed all spoke English so I was able to 
conduct interviews without a translator. None of the interviews were recorded due to reticence 
on the part of interviewees to being recorded. I took detailed notes during the interviews. I 
concluded these interviews when all new referrals were of previously identified organizations or 
individuals. Including my two informants, I interviewed fifteen individuals from eight Non-
governmental Organizations and the government who were orking on CFUG participation in 
carbon payment programs. 
Each interview involved a semi-structured questionnaire using largely open ended 
questions because I was just beginning my research and did not want to limit my interviews by 
my lack of knowledge on the subject. Furthermore, because the interviews began at a very 
simple level, this approach allowed coverage of the basics surrounding community forestry and 
carbon policy in Nepal. This method worked well because it confirmed that the basic theory I 
learned from my background research was relevant to what was currently practiced in Nepal. It 
also allowed me to learn a great deal from Nepalis who had been working in community forestry 
since its inception in Nepal. Interviews were conducted for one to two hours. The goal of the 
interviews with NGO members was to gain an understanding of each organization’s activities in 
relation to carbon payments and community forestry; be ond gaining this background, the 
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interviews were open to whatever subjects the NGO or government member wanted to talk about 
on this topic. For example, issues of government corol over CFUGs and CFUG good 
governance came up frequently. 
From these interviews, I confirmed that the RCMFN project was the only fully functional 
carbon payment project in Nepal. This project is funded by the Norwegian Development 
Corporation (NORAD). The project is implemented by three NGOs: International Centre for 
Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD), the Asia Network for Sustainable Agriculture and 
Bioresources (ANSAB) and FECOFUN. The RCMFN project is a pilot project intended to help 
Nepal prepare to participate in REDD+ (RCMFN 2013). The main offices for all three 
organizations are located in Kathmandu.  
 
RCMFN NGO Interviews 
 These interviews were with members of the NGOs in charge of implementing the 
RCMFN project (Fig 1), step 2A and 4A. I interviewed the person in charge of implementing the 
RCMFN project at each of the three NGOs (ANSAB, ICIMOD, and FECOFUN) responsible for 
RCMFN implementation. I chose these individuals because they were considered by the head of 
their respective organizations as the most knowledgeable person about their organization’s 
participation in RCMFN. The NGO members I interviewed all spoke English so I was able to 
interact without a translator. None of the interviews were recorded due to reticence on the part of 
interviewees to being recorded. I took detailed notes during the interviews. I interviewed one 
person from each organization or a total of three. 
 
Initial RCMFN Interviews, (Fig 1), Step 2A: 
The initial interviews lasted about one hour and I used a guided questionnaire. The goal 
of the interviews was to gain a more detailed understanding of the RCMFN project than I was 
able to gain from project documentation so I could effectively conduct interviews with CFUGs 
that were participation in RCMFN. 
 
Closing RCMFN NGO Interviews, (Fig 1), Step 4A:  
The final interviews lasted 1-2 hours and again I used guided questionnaires. The goal of 
the interviews was to determine: 1) how the NGO initiates involvement with the CFUGs with 
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which it works and what is the initial selection crite ia?; 2) do NGOs have an educational 
component for their partner CFUGs (e.g., climate change, carbon sequestration, carbon 
markets)? 3) how much does the NGO invest (e.g. time, oney) in each CFUG with which they 
work? 4) how is the carbon assessment conducted and is it participatory? 5) why did NGOs 
choose the carbon standard and carbon market with which they work?;  and 6) what mechanisms 
do NGOs use to receive input from the CFUGs with which they work? 
 
REDD Cell Interviews 
Also in my preliminary interviews I identified the REDD Forestry and Climate Change 
CELL (REDD Cell) is the group within Nepal’s Department of Forests (DoF) working on 
implementation of the United Nations Reducing Emission  from Deforestation and Forest 
Degradation, including Conservation and Sustainable Management of Forest and Enhancement 
of Forest Carbon Stocks (REDD+) program in Nepal (Fig 1), step 2A and 4A. Participation in 
the REDD+ program is the government’s primary explorati n into carbon payment policy. The 
REDD Cell offices are within the DoF office complex in Kathmandu. 
The interviews I conducted were with members of the government who worked in The 
REDD Forestry and Climate Change Cell (REDD Cell). I interviewed the two individuals in 
charge of implementing the government REDD+ program. These individuals were considered by 
the director of the REDD Cell as the most knowledgeabl  people about government REDD+ 
activities. The government members I interviewed all spoke English so I was able to conduct 
them without a translator. None of the interviews were recorded due to reticence on the part of 
interviewees to being recorded. I took detailed notes during the interviews.  
 
Initial REDD Cell Interviews, (Fig 1), Step 2B: 
 The initial interviews lasted about one hour and I used a guided questionnaires. The goal 
of the interviews was to gain a more detailed understanding of the government REDD Cell than I 
was able to obtain from program documentation so I could more effectively conduct interviews 
with RCMFN participant CFUGs who will hopefully be able to participate in a National REDD+ 
program. 
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Closing REDD Cell Interviews, (Fig 1), Step 4B: 
 The final interviews lasted one to two hours and I again used guided questionnaires. The 
goal of the interviews was to determine: 1) what is the governments interpretation of CFUG 
eligibility to participate in carbon payments 2) what is the government’s position on carbon 
ownership 3) what is the time line for REDD+ implemntation and the start of the performance 
phase of REDD+? 4) what are the mechanisms under consideration for measurement and 
verification? 
 
Community Forest User Group Interviews and Focus Group Sessions in Kayar Khola and 
Charnawati  
I then shifted my research to two of the RCMFN project sites. My goal for this part of the 
study was to understand how the specifics of the RCMFN project operate at the CFUG level, 
(Fig 1), step 3A and 3B. First I interviewed CFUG executives and then conducted focus group 
interviews with CFUG members. Analysis at this leve seemed appropriate because the literature 
on REDD+ in community forestry in Nepal is dominated by analysis of theoretical opportunities 
and constraints and is heavily focused on practitioner implementation (Dahal & Banskota 2009; 
Bushley & Khatri 2011). Furthermore Bleaney et al. (2009) identified forest users as the people 
who will feel the biggest impact from REDD+ participation in Nepal.   
I initiated this research by interviewing CFUG executives (Fig 1), Step 3A. My key 
informants and RCMFN staff whom I interviewed recommended that CFUG presidents were a 
good place to start because they would be most knowledgeable about the RCMFN project. 
Furthermore, most presidents self identified as the most knowledgeable person about RCMFN in 
the CFUG. There were several cases where the president identified the vice president or 
secretary as the most knowledgeable person about REDD+. CFUG members uniformly reported 
presidents or CFUG executives as the most knowledgeable people in the CFUG about REDD+. 
These interviews were predominately held with CFUG presidents but because CFUG vice 
presidents or secretaries were sometimes included, I r fer to them as executive interviews.  
After the executive interviews, I conducted CFUG memb r focus groups (Fig 1), Step 
3B. Lack of research on CFUG member perceptions and the fact that members are likely to be 
most affected by REDD+ participation were the main motivations for conducting focus group 
interviews with members. Furthermore, everyone I interviewed in Kathmandu, many of whom 
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had worked in community forestry since its inception, reported that if I wanted to understand 
community forestry participation in carbon payment programs, I needed to talk to CFUG 
members. I chose focus groups over individual interviews with CFUG members because CFUG 
executives noted that CFUG members often have limited knowledge about CFUG operations and 
RCMFN participation. I felt focus groups would provide better information because CFUG 
members would have the opportunity to discuss the topics with each other that I provided.  
 
Table 1. Number of Executive interviews and focus groups in Chitwan and Dolakha districts. 
 
 Kayar Khola watershed, 
Chitwan District, 16 
participating CFUGs 
 
Charnawati watershed, 
Dolakha District, 58 
participating CFUGs 
CFUG Executive 
Interviews 
Interviews were conducted 
with 16 of 16 CFUGs 
(100%). 
Interviews were conducted 
with 10 of 58 CFUG (17%). 
CFUG Members Focus 
Groups 
 
 
 
 
Two focus groups were 
conducted at four CFUGs 
for a total of 8 focus groups 
with an average of 12 
people; 96 total participants. 
Two focus groups were 
conducted at four CFUGs 
for a total of 8 focus groups 
with an average of 9 people; 
72 total participants. 
 
CFUG Executives, (Fig 1), Step 3A:  
My goal for the CFUG executive interviews was to determine: 1) the objective 
involvement of each CFUG in the program including what was required of each CFUG to 
participate (e.g. change in management, time investm nt and carbon measurement); and 2) their  
perception of the  benefits of CFUG participation in a carbon credit program; 3) the estimated 
cost of CFUG participation in a carbon credit program; 4) the necessary inputs from outside 
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sources (e.g. need for NGO support); and 5) the ability of the CFUG to continue to participate in 
the carbon credit program without outside help. 
 Using an interpreter, the interviews with CFUG executives were conducted in Nepali.   
These interviews were recorded and transcribed verbatim. For these interviews I used a list of 
questions to ensure consistency among the interviews; follow up probes were employed for 
clarity. CFUG presidents requested to conduct the interviews at their office except when there 
was no CFUG office.  In those few cases, the presidents requested to be interviewed at their 
homes. In some interviews the presidents requested the presence of the CFUG vice president or 
secretary because they considered them to be the most kn wledgeable person about the CFUG 
operations and RCMFN participation. During these int rviews, secretaries or vice presidents 
contributed 25-75% of answers. In others, the secretary or vice president was present at the 
office and mostly listened and only occasionally provided technical details requested by the 
president. I believe inclusion of vice presidents and secretaries improved the quality of these 
interviews because they helped fill in gaps in what t e president knew. I did not find a difference 
in perspective about community forestry or REDD+ in Community Managed Forests in Nepal 
(RCMFN) participation between interviews with or without these additional participants. This 
led me to conclude that concern raised by interviewing slightly different groups of people for the 
executive interviews was outweighed by including peopl  who were most knowledgeable about 
the program. Thirty five people participated in theexecutive interviews.  
  I was able to interview all sixteen CFUG presidents i  Kayar Khola and ten of the fifty 
eight presidents in Charniwati. I used a random number generator and a numbered list of the fifty 
eight CFUGs in Charniwati to randomly select those CFUGs. I scheduled twelve interviews but I 
was not able to contact one of the presidents and another one was always too busy to be 
interviewed.  I was limited to twelve interviews due to time constraints. I felt that the CFUG 
executives whom I was able to interview were representative of the CFUGs in Charniwati 
watershed. They came from CFUGs of various size and wealth but most were from smaller and 
less wealthy groups In Charniwati there were four remote CFUGs in the watershed; three were 
not in my random sample and I could not contact the fourth executive.  
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CFUG Focus Group Interviews (Fig 1), Step 3B: 
After completing CFUG executive interviews, I conducted focus group interviews with 
CFUG members in both study sites. Focus groups wereorganized with CFUG members because 
I wanted to learn about their perspectives regarding community forestry and RCMFN project 
participation. I used focus groups to gain insight into user group perceptions of existing 
community forest management and their expectation of changes in community forest practices 
under RCMFN. The objectives of the focus group interviews was to determine: 1) perceived 
benefit versus cost of CFUG participation in a carbon credit program; 2) how CFUG members 
are involved in deciding if the CFUG will participate in the carbon credit program; 3) what 
motivates CFUG members to support participation in the carbon credit program; and 4) how and 
to whom will carbon payments be made? I asked participants to discuss these four themes and 
followed up with probes used to clarify and encourage further conversation such as: “are there 
other benefits from RCMFN participation in addition to money?” and “how do members 
influence specific financial investments such as spending on poverty alleviation?” The focus 
group discussions were held in Nepali with the assistance of a translator; they were recorded and 
later transcribed.  
I conducted focus group interviews in four CFUGs within each study site. I decided to 
divide two focus groups by gender within each of thse CFUGs for a total of eight focus groups 
in each study site. The purpose of this action was not to assess differences based on gender but 
simply to encourage women to feel more comfortable in xpressing themselves (Morgan & 
Kruger 1993, Kitzinger 1995). Furthermore, gender differences in CFUG participation, as well as 
female roles in Nepal, are well documented (Nightingale 2002). About halfway through the 
focus groups in both sites, after completing four to five, I began to hear mostly the same answers. 
By the time I completed all interviews I was no longer hearing anything new in relation to my 
core questions about community forestry and RCMFN participation. For this reason I felt that I 
had conducted an adequate number of focus group sessions.  
The CFUGs where the focus groups were conducted were chosen randomly from the 
CFUGs in my study. I selected the male and female prticipate in the focus groups in the 
following way. In both Kayar Khola and Charnawati, I used CFUG member lists to select the 
participants. These lists included a male and femal head of household. I took a random sample, 
using a random number generator, of 15 men and 15 women to form my two focus groups. The 
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actual attendance of the focus groups was seven to fifteen people. A total of approximately one 
hundred and eighty people in Kayar Khola and one hundred people in Charnawati participated in 
the focus groups.  
 
Data Analysis:  
I typed up all of my interviews with NGO and Government personnel. My interpreter 
transcribed all of the CFUG executive and focus group interviews from Nepali to English. After 
transcription, I entered each into NVivo. NVivo constructs an electronic catalog of sections of 
text that the user codes to a particular theme. For example, a theme on fire wood harvesting can 
be created and all references to this topic in the transcripts can be coded with that theme. After 
this step is completed, the user can quickly find all references to fire wood harvesting within all 
of the transcripts. 
Open coding was used to develop themes based on patterns in behavior and opinions and 
through existing theory about CFUG participation in carbon payment programs (Corbin & 
Strauss 2008). I initially coded the transcripts baed on themes related to CFUG participation in 
carbon markets that I identified from the literature and during my research. For example, lack of 
CFUG technical capacity was identified in the literature as a constraint on CFUG participation. 
When I discovered references to this topic in the transcripts, I marked them with the appropriate 
code.  
Theme development involved careful comparison among interviews noting similarities 
and differences in opinion and behavior within and cross levels (CFUG members and 
executives, and NGO and Government members). I focused on issues related to CFUG carbon 
credit participation as well as broader issues within community forestry that affect carbon 
payment participation. As I coded more transcripts, new themes emerged and some older ones 
shifted or were combined. For example, I was not initially aware that users and executives were 
so concerned about government or NGO corruption related to carbon payments. Once I identified 
this issue as important, I returned to transcripts I had already coded and added this new theme. 
Once I had coded all of the transcripts, I began to rec gnize relationships between levels and 
how they interacted. For example, I was able to identify that uncertainty about the future of 
global REDD+ policy affected government and NGO actors and that this in turn affected CFUG 
executives and members.  
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Limitations of My Methodology: 
Use of semi-structured interviews and small sample siz led to lack of comparability 
between CFUG presidents and focus groups and limits y ability to make comparisons across 
CFUGs within the districts. Although these concerns are significant, CFUGs in these two 
districts are operating under the same national guidelines as the rest of Nepal and the challenges 
in community forestry that (Kanel 2006) notes also ar se during my interviews and focus groups 
in these two districts. For example: lack of silvicultural capacity, concerns over informed user 
participation, and challenges balancing resource use and sustainable management. This 
observation suggests that while there will be differences among districts, the general issues that I 
identified will provide a starting point for understanding community forest participation in 
REDD+. 
Caste and gender were not at the forefront of my analysis and this is a limitation of my 
study.  However this was my first research in Nepal and I felt it was important to limit my focus 
to make my study more manageable and I did take steps to include these groups into my sample. 
At the CFUG level, in each CFUG where I conducted focus group interviews I conducted 
one with female members and one with male members. Thi  meant that my overall data set from 
my focus group interviews contained both men and women’s perspectives about CFUG 
participation in REDD+ based programs. 
In terms of caste, one of the main factors for choosing Kayar Khola and Charniwati 
watersheds was that they were considered to be diverse, both in ethnicity and caste. Again, I did 
not specifically analyze my data to assess differences between these groups but their diverse 
opinions were included in the overall sample. 
Finally, RCMFN is a pilot project and the Nepal government and other institutions are 
attempting to devise and implement a national carbon payment plan. Results from my study 
should be used as a source to inform this process but findings are more limited in their ability to 
inform similar programs in other countries. 
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CHAPTER 4. RESULTS 
In this chapter I present the results concerning opportunities and constraints for 
community forest user groups to participate in and benefit from REDD+ participation. These 
findings are based on the perspectives of the study’s three main groups: (1) government staff 
(REDD Cell and other), (2) RCMFN and other NGO staff, nd (3) CFUG executives and 
members.  Before I present the results it is important o acknowledge that CFUG executive and 
member perspectives are based on their direct experi nc  with the REDD+ in Community 
Managed Forests in Nepal project (RCMFN); they have limited knowledge about REDD+ policy 
and initiatives, within Nepal and internationally. Government REDD Cell personnel RCMFN 
staff (as well as other NGO and government staff) have some knowledge about REDD+ policy 
and initiatives in Nepal and internationally but have limited direct knowledge of policy 
implications for CFUGs.  
I present the results in three sections. The first focuses on how global carbon standards 
and the ongoing negotiations surrounding them offer opportunities and constraints for 
community forest user group (CFUG) participation in programs based on REDD+. The second 
discusses how each of the different actors -- CFUGs, NGOs and Nepali government employees -
- view their roles within the development and operation of REDD+ programs in Nepal. The third 
reviews the capacity of CFUGs to participate in andmanage tasks required by REDD+ in an 
effective and equitable manner. 
Section 1 begins with a discussion of the constraints international REDD+ policy places 
on CFUG participation in REDD+ based programs. The primary results relate to how the 
structure and requirements of these policies affect REDD+ implementers in Nepal and in turn 
affect CFUGs participation in these programs. CFUG ability to participate in these programs is 
negatively impacted by uncertainty about REDD and RCMFN’s future, as well as meeting 
international requirements that CFUGs work directly with REDD+ related offices in the Nepali 
government.  
Section two presents the challenges for NGO and government partners to serve as 
linkages between CFUGs and global carbon markets. These challenges include conflict between 
the DoF and CFUGs over carbon ownership, lack of clarity about management authority, limited 
education and poor communication about REDD+ and RCMFN to both CFUG executives and 
members.  
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Section three summarizes key constraints for CFUG participation: lack of CFUG 
knowledge about carbon measurements and the unknown c sts of participation. It then moves to 
review four opportunities for participating in REDD+: CFUG willingness to invest in training, 
direct benefits from participation, increased CFUG member awareness of ecosystem services and 
opportunities for improved CFUG governance. 
 
Opportunities and Constraints that Global Carbon Standards and the Ongoing 
Negotiations Surrounding Them Offer CFUG Participation in Programs Based on REDD+ 
Results were derived from my analysis of interviews with RCMFN, REDD Cell 
members, other NGO and government members and CFUG based programs. Constraints 
involve:  1) uncertainty about the REDD+ program and the future of REDD+, and 2) 
requirements that CFUGs participate with the governme t. These issues are presented in greater 
detail below. 
 
Uncertainty about REDD+ and REDD+’s Future: 
 Internationally, REDD+ policy is still under development and Nepal is in the first stages 
of establishing a national REDD+ implementation framework. Both of these factors create great 
uncertainty for NGOs, the Nepali government and executives and members of CFUGs 
participating in the RCMFN project; this left many players unsure how the program will operate 
and if it will be beneficial for CFUGs.  
Lack of clear REDD+ technical protocols hampers RCMFN and REDD Cell member 
efforts to develop and test carbon measurement methodologies. Despite this uncertainty, ground-
based schemes that rely on CFUG members to measure the forest instead of outside experts from 
Kathmandu are being tested by the RCMFN project. RCMFN and REDD Cell staff are 
concerned that any ground based measurement scheme will b impractical to implement 
throughout all of Nepal. The main alternative under iscussion is a combination of remote 
sensing and ground based measurements. A government REDD Cell member commented as 
follows on technical protocol development: 
 
“Different organizations are also researching the us  of GIS and remote sensing 
solutions.”  
REDD cell personnel 
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While several methodologies are under investigation, there is little consensus among 
RCMFN and REDD Cell staff as well other NGOs in Nepal on which will work best as each 
approach has its own shortcomings. 
Another RCMFN and REDD Cell staff uncertainty, the cost of measurement and 
marketability of small community forests, has led those studying carbon payment 
implementation to propose bundling CFUGs into larger blocks. The criteria for determining 
profitable size of a community forest  is dependent on several factors including current 
management practices, carbon sequestration rate and access to technical facilitation. An RCMFN 
staffer explains this issue as follows:  
 
“The small forest faces this problem-- the problem of the carbon being worth less than 
the cost of measurement. Small CFUGs can’t independently participate. This is a big 
problem. Larger CFUGs can participate. This situation is one of the primary reasons why 
bundling is being suggested.” 
   RCMFN staff 
 
To address concerns about profitability of small community forests, the RCMFN program 
bundled CFUGs together to create economies of scale. E ch pilot site consisted of an entire 
watershed. One bundle is located in Gorkha where 31 community forests are grouped to 
encompass 1,888 ha. Similarly, 58 CF in Dolakha, consisting of 5,996 ha were grouped as were 
16 community forests in Chitwan that total 2,382 ha. This effort at establishing a “bundling 
scale” under the RCMFN project serves as a test to create an appropriate scale for a 
monitoring/marketing system in community forests. 
The greatest uncertainty raised by government officers and senior NGO staff was that 
CFUGs might not be eligible to participate in REDD+ because they are already increasing 
carbon sequestration under their current management.  REDD+ makes payments based on how 
much additional carbon a forest sequesters as a result of changes in management. Based on these 
criteria, senior forestry experts in Kathmandu felt that even if CFUGs can improve management 
potential, payments may be too small to make REDD+ participation viable.  
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Nepal’s REDD+ cell staff stressed that this lack of clarity on how international REDD+ 
programs will deal with CFUGs that are already increasing forest biomass is a serious 
impediment to REDD+ implementation. This point was explained to me in the following way: 
 
“The issue is that community forests already manage their forests well and REDD and 
REDD+ reward improved management or avoided deforestation. The problem being 
there is little most CFUGs can do to dramatically improve management. Most CFUGs did 
that 10-20 years ago.”  
REDD cell personnel 
 
Furthermore these well managed community forests are ineligible for avoided-
deforestation payments because CFUG executives and members in both study sites already 
consider sustainable management ideal for maximizing current forest benefits.  
Another constraint to REDD+ implementation is the reluctance of those involved with 
REDD+ in the government, NGOs and CFUG executives to accept the requirements that carbon 
measurements be verified by international versus Nepali xperts. They all believe that outside 
verifiers are too expensive for Nepal to effectively participate in REDD+. This requirement is 
also widely opposed by the government and NGO personnel I interviewed on the principle that 
Nepal has been dominated for too long by foreign experts who receive high salaries that drain off 
funds from international development projects. This belief was explained to me in the following 
way: 
 
“Third party and or other country verification is too expensive. Also Nepal wants its own 
third party verifiers. Nepal wants its own third party verifiers both for reasons of cost and 
reasons of principle.”  
Government REDD Cell personnel 
 
 The government and NGO personnel who opposed outside verifiers felt that Nepal should 
insist on Nepali verifiers but also noted that it mght not be accepted by international REDD+ 
policy implementers at the UNFCCC. 
The Red Cell completed a draft REDD+ implementation plan in 2012. However, 
members of the Red Cell felt that because of REDD+’s complex requirements, Nepal will not be 
ready to fully participate in REDD+ until about 2020.  
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They attribute this delay to the technical complexiti s of establishing Nepal’s baseline 
carbon level and the need to identify an effective system for measuring, verification, and 
payment distribution. A REDD Cell member stated: 
  
“Nepal will not be ready to participate in the performance based phase by 2020. This is 
due to the fact that so many studies are needed to get the data ready to be able to 
participate (i.e. baseline carbon data, leakage data, and a verification mechanism).”  
REDD Cell personnel 
 
Due to the complexities and long time line associated with establishing Nepal’s carbon 
baseline, creating an effective system for carbon measuring, monitoring, and payment 
distribution, and the relative insignificance of Nepal’s forests compared to those in Brazil or 
Indonesia, REDD+ is viewed skeptically even by staff of the DoF and community forestry 
NGOs, who are trying to promote CFUG participation. This belief was explained to me in the 
following way: 
 
“REDD+ in Nepal is a dream because countries like Brazil and Indonesia are so much 
larger; it makes Nepal irrelevant.”  
NGO staffer 
 
Despite RCMFN and REDD Cell concerns about CFUG eligibi ty in carbon payment 
programs, these uncertainties have not been communicated to CFUG executives and members 
who are unaware of these issues. 
 Another important uncertainty was the widespread feeling by CFUG members that 
REDD+ is just another outside development project tha will soon be gone. 
  
“There were many projects implemented in this area b fore REDD+ but all couldn’t 
remain for long, which reduces the trust into whatever projects come for the CFUG.” 
   CFUG president 
 
REDD+ is viewed with ambivalence by CFUG members in both study sites because so 
many projects have come and gone. Following is evidence of the sense that many development 
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projects exist only briefly: when I was discussing the RCMFN project with CFUG members they 
often mistakenly called it by another project’s name or they confused the details of RCMFN with 
those of another project.  
Furthermore, CFUG executives and members in both study sites expressed concern over 
the longevity of the RCMFN project. They felt that if the program only lasted a few years it 
would not be profitable to participate. This belief was explained to me in the following way: 
 
“The RCMFN program runs through the end of 2013 and there is no idea of what will 
come after the RCMFN program.”  
RCMFN staff 
 
“We would be interested in participating if we had to pay the full cost of measurement 
but only if the REDD+ program will last a long time. The people at this CFUG are 
concerned that the program is about to come to an end.”  
   CFUG president 
 
Despite these uncertainties, CFUG executives from bth Chitwan and Dolakha and, 
members of the government and the NGO REDD+ community believe RCMFN and future 
REDD+ programs are low risk for participation. A CFUG executive said: 
 
“It’s not only because of REDD+ that we conserve th forest. We are now aware about 
the advantages of using limited resources. If there was no REDD+ then also we would 
have conserved our forest. It’s the benefit for us as well as our future generations.”  
CFUG focus group 
 
Even if the program fails to deliver payments, the for st will still be there and 
theoretically be in better condition than at present because of conservation practices REDD+ 
participation encourages. CFUG members will have also gained more skills and be refocused on 
the importance of forest conservation. A CFUG member stated that: 
 
“You can make Alaska New York, but you can’t make Nw York Alaska. If carbon 
trading doesn’t work then you are left with the forest, a great resource.”  
DoF staff 
 
 The key points to take away from this section are that the slowness of development of 
international REDD+ policy and concerns about CFUG eligibility create uncertainty that 
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negatively affects REDD+ implementation in Nepal. However, despite this uncertainty REDD+ 
is seen as low risk by the government, NGO and CFUGs because it promotes forest 
conservation. 
 
CFUG Unease about Requirement to Work with the Governm nt: 
 Currently, CFUGs in my two study sites do not work with the government.   However, 
RCMFN was designed to be a temporary project with the goal of instructing the development of 
Nepal’s national REDD+ program and CFUGs that wish to continue to receive REDD+ 
payments after its completion will have to join Nepal’s national REDD+ program.  Nepal’s 
national program will be undertaken with the support of the UN-REDD Program, the World 
Bank’s Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) and the Forest Inventory Program (FIP). All 
these programs work directly with national governmets. This means that CFUGs will be 
required to work directly with their National government to receive carbon payments.  
When I asked CFUG executives and members in my two s udy sites about potentially 
working with the DoF to participating in REDD+ they viewed this as problematic because the 
government lacks stability, technical capacity for REDD+ implementation and concerns about 
corruption.  
Lack of government stability has been an issue in Nepal for a long time. Most recently, 
since the collapse of the constitutional assembly in August 2012, the government is, at best, a 
quasi-legal governing body. At the time of my intervi ws, national elections were scheduled for 
November 2013 and CFUG executives and members were not confident that the election will re-
establish a functioning government.   
One of the consequences of long term governmental instability in Nepal is that many of 
its departments, including the Department of Forests (DoF) lacks the financial and technical 
resources to implement what they are legally required to do. The DoF currently cannot even meet 
the mandates of the 1993 Forestry Act or those identified under a proposed national REDD+ 
payment program. 
Another consequence of long term governmental instability and lack of financial 
resources for government departments is the pervasive nature of corruption within Nepal’s 
government. Interviews with CFUG executives and memb rs in both study sites indicate there is 
a strong desire to work directly with international c rbon programs. The reason CFUG 
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executives gave is that they want to avoid “middle men”, “the government”, and “Nepali 
NGOs.” They are fearful that these agents in their own country will take “a portion of the money, 
leaving the CFUG with less” (CFUG president). Another CFUG president summarized this issue 
as follows: 
 
“We want to have direct dialog with the organization that gives the money for carbon. 
We don’t like the idea of money going first to the government and then to us 
(government as intermediary) because of corruption/ middle men. There are many holes 
for the money to go; we will get little money.” 
CFUG president 
 
An NGO staffer confirmed this sentiment. 
 
“CFUGs don’t want the carbon money to go through the government. They think the 
money will not just be reduced by graft and administrative fees but that it will not arrive 
at all. “ 
   NGO staff 
 
The reason CFUGs prefer to work directly with interational donors is that they believe 
international organizations are more likely to ensure they receive their fair share of any carbon 
payments that may be made. Unfortunately, working directly with international carbon programs 
is currently against international REDD+ policy.  
CFUGs are uneasy about working with the government b cause DoF staff have argued 
that the DoF deserves a portion of the carbon payments to cover the technical and administrative 
costs of implementing and supervising a national REDD+ program. A member of the 
government REDD Cell stated that: 
 
“The global model for REDD+, e.g. The World Bank and United Nations-REDD+ 
models, is to negotiate directly with the government. The DoF wants to claim some of the 
money because they want money and also because of th cost of facilitation.” 
   REDD Cell personnel 
 
Funding from the World Bank’s Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) is intended to 
pay for REDD+ preparedness efforts by the Nepal government and help develop capacity within 
the DoF were needed. Members of the DoF and staff of CFUG NGO’s also see FCPF funding 
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and efforts to prepare Nepal’s forestry sector for REDD+ as a chance to address “second 
generation issues” within community forestry that also affect carbon payment distribution. These 
issues include the need for increased administrative nd silvicultural capacity at the DoF and 
CFUG level, distribution of benefits to communities without access to or ability to start a CFUG, 
improvement of CFUG governance, and equitable resource distribution. However, no plan has 
been developed to combine REDD+ preparedness with a strategy to address these issues outside 
of building technical capacity related to REDD+ participation within the DoF. 
 The key points to take away from this section are that CFUGs are uneasy about working 
with the government because of governmental instability and lack of government technical 
capacity to implement REDD+.  Furthermore lack of gvernment technical capacity is the only 
one of these issues that is being addressed at this time. 
 
Section summary: 
Uncertainty about carbon assessment methodology and program longevity decreases 
CFUGs willingness to participate in the RCFMN pilot project or a future national REDD+ 
program. Also, requirements that CFUGs have to work directly with the government to 
participate in national REDD+ program make participation more challenging.  
 
View of Each Actor’s (CFUGs, NGOs, Nepali Government Employees) Role Within the 
Development and Operation of REDD+ Programs in Nepal 
Issues concerning governance, conflict and carbon ownership, as well as CFUG need for 
a linking organization between CFUGs and international programs, creates challenges for the 
implementation of a national REDD+ program.  
 
Governance, Conflict and Carbon Ownership in Nepal: 
CFUGs and the DoF are legal partners in community forest management and the DoF 
role as REDD+ administrator in Nepal is likely to deepen this relationship. As noted above, the 
government legally owns the forest but CFUGs have management authority, albeit authority that 
requires supervision and permission by the DoF suchas for community forest management plans 
and practices. On the ground, there is often a contentious relationship between CFUGs and the 
DoF. CFUG participation in a national REDD+ program is affected by this situation. RCMFN, as 
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a pilot project run by an NGO, does not face these challenges; however, the CFUGs that 
participate in RCMFN will eventually join the national program. Two areas in which these 
organizations have conflicting views are the overall objective of community forestry and 
proposed changes to the law governing community forestry. 
 
Role of CFUGs in Nepal: 
CFUGs and the DoF have differing views on what the rol of CFUGs is and how their 
revenue should be spent. The dominant view among members of the DoF whom I interviewed is 
that the primary objective of community forestry is improvement of the forests. CFUG 
executives and members feel that community forests should benefit the users and their revenue 
should be invested in community development. The DoF believes that CFUGs should not operate 
as community development organizations and this was explained to me in the following way: 
 
“CFUGs should not invest money into community development projects, this is not their 
purpose. They should only invest money into forest development and improvement.” 
DoF staff 
 
In contrast, CFUG executives and members reported that returns from community forest 
activities should be invested in community development. For example, a CFUG president stated 
that:  
 
“The CFUG is the organization that helps invest in the development of the community 
including roads, health posts, ambulances, irrigation canals, goat farms, and other 
programs.“ 
CFUG president 
 
Furthermore, a CFUG focus group concluded that: 
 
“This CF has constructed roads, temples, schools, bridges. It has helped in providing “old 
allowance”, allowance given to the disabled and wido s, scholarships, bio-gas 
construction, goat farming, poverty elimination and many more things.” 
   CFUG focus group 
 
To CFUG executives and members, community development and improvement of local well 
being are primary objectives of CFUG.  
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This conflict may increase with the implementation of a government run REDD+ 
program. These funds will be controlled by the DoF and this agency is likely to require that they 
be invested in forest management where as CFUGs have expressed interest in using these funds 
for expanding community development. Although debat over CFUG objectives is a major 
source of conflict between CFUGs and the DoF, an even more contentious issue is the DoF’s 
efforts to increase its legal authority and taxation of CFUGs. 
 
Forestry law change: 
In 2011, after several high profile cases of deforestation and corruption within CFUGs, a 
commission was formed to investigate and propose changes in CFUG governance. In winter 
2012, several amendments to the 1993 Forestry Act were proposed by government legislators. 
Not all of the details around these proposals were made public and the law’s passage was stalled 
by collapse of the government in June 2012. The future of the proposed Forestry Act is 
unknown. 
The issues that the proposed amendments attempt to address are corruption and benefit 
distribution at the CFUG level. Proponents of the Act state that the DoF needs to have increased 
oversight over CFUGs to prevent corruption in the form of illegal timber harvest. The changes 
would increase oversight authority of the DoF and decrease the decision making autonomy of 
CFUGs. The other issue associated with the proposed changes to the Forestry Act is distribution 
of benefits from CFUGs to others who cannot become a member of a CFUG or establish a 
CFUG. To address this issue, the DoF would increase taxation on CFUGs and distribute that 
money to areas that do not have access to forests.  
While the exact effect and motivation for these lega  changes can be debated, the view of 
CFUG executives I studied is that these changes are an attempt by the DoF to take control over 
and benefit from CFUG hard earned resources. A CFUG president summarized CF sentiment as 
follows: 
 
“If the Department of Forests takes back control of our CFUG, I will go to the forest and 
cut it down because those are our trees that we hav put the work into protecting and we 
will not let them take the benefit of our work.”  
CFUG president 
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 Conflict over efforts by the DoF to increase taxation and control over CFUGs further 
contributes to mistrust between CFUGs and the DoF and h s led some members of CFUGs to 
view these as government attempts to re-appropriate community forest resources. Lack of trust 
between these groups and concerns over resource re-app opriation creates challenges for DoF 
and CFUG cooperation in addressing issues related to national REDD+ preparedness. 
 
Carbon ownership: 
Efforts by the DoF to control CFUG decision making and increase taxation on CFUGs 
has left executives and members fearful about maintaini g long term control over community 
forests and this issue has implications for REDD+ implementation in Nepal. For example, in the 
debate over carbon ownership, the DoF is proposing that soil carbon is owned by the Nepali 
government and above ground forest carbon is owned by the CFUGs. The following quote 
illustrates this issue: 
 
“Legally the trees are owned by the CFUG.  Thus the tre  carbon is owned by the CFUG. 
Legally the soil is owned by the government.  Thus the soil carbon is owned by the 
government.” 
    REDD Cell personnel 
 
When the government REDD Cell personnel articulate their positions on carbon 
ownership, they express both a desire to gain access to financial resources and the need to share 
in some of the carbon payments in exchange for perceived future costs for operating a national 
carbon payment program. This was stated as follows: 
  
“This issue [who owns the carbon] is under discussion. CFUGs believe they should get 
all the carbon money because the forests are theirs and their good management of those 
forests has put the carbon in the soil. The governmnt wants both the money for the 
moneys sake but also from a bargaining perspective. Th  government is investing a lot 
into preparedness and will act as a facilitator and wants a share of the funds for the effort 
of facilitation.” 
 
“Who owns the carbon is under debate by people in the DoF. The DoF wants to claim 
some of the money because they want money and also because of the cost of facilitation.” 
REDD Cell personnel 
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The debate over carbon ownership is occurring at the government and NGO level.  
However, CFUG executives and member views on efforts by the DoF to gain access to carbon 
money and control of the carbon program are likely to be influenced by past DoF efforts to 
control CFUG decision making and resources as further attempts to do the same. 
Feelings on the part of CFUG members and executives that the government cannot be 
trusted will make negotiations over what portion of carbon payments the DoF takes to run a 
national REDD+ program more challenging.  
The key points to take away from this section are that CFUG executives and members do 
not trust the DoF because of past efforts to control CFUGs and their financial resources. This 
lack of trust means that when the DoF comes to them to negotiate about REDD+ policy they are 
not confident that the DoF has their interests in mi d. In fact many executives and members feel 
the opposite. Thus CFUGs are likely to view any DoF proposal for REDD+ implementation that 
does not hand over all carbon payments to CFUGs with serious skepticism. 
 
Executive and User Engagement and Understanding of REDD+ and RCMFN:  
Some of the participating CFUG initially rejected the RCMFN project due to concerns 
about executive overreach and forest resource availability. In addition RCMFN implementation 
has been further hampered by challenges with dispersing information about the program. 
 
Executive and user engagement: 
The REDD+ in Community Managed Forests Nepal (RCMFN) project’s CFUG 
engagement process started by holding meetings with all of the CFUG executives in the selected 
watersheds. First the executives had the project explained to them, they were told the project 
would have no costs and the CFUGs will receive financi l payments and training in 
administrative as well as silvicultural techniques.  Second these executives, in turn, explained to 
their members the RCMFN project as it was described to them. In the Kayar Khola watershed, 
there was no resistance to participation, however in Charnawati, about half of the CFUGs 
initially rejected the RCMFN project. 
In Charnawati, CFUG executives met at a nearby municipal ty, Charikot, and were given 
an explanation of the program by RCMFN staff. They subsequently returned to the CFUG 
membership to gain approval for participation in the program through a formal vote. The 
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program was rejected by CFUG members on the basis of the following two reasons. First CFUG 
members felt that their executives had already agreed to participate in the program without 
consulting them. The second may be due to concerns about resource reduction related to 
RCMFN participation. While CFUG members in Kayar Khola report getting enough resources 
from the forest for their needs (e.g. fodder, fuelwood, and timber) in Charnawati, most of the 
CFUG members reported that they cannot always acquire the resources they need from their 
community forest. In Charnawati, member households j in multiple CFUGs to better access 
wood product needs. Even with membership in multiple CFUGs, some individuals still report a 
lack of resources for their households and stated th y had to turn to outside sources such as the 
market or private land to meet their forest product needs.   
After the program was rejected in Charnawati, RCMFN project staff made presentations 
to CFUGs about program participation and what it would involve. After these special sessions, 
all resistant CFUGs in the watershed agreed to participle in the RCMFN project.  
  
Understanding of REDD+ and RCMFN: 
Lack of awareness of CFUG operations is another issue with member engagement. A 
problem reported by most CFUG executives across both wa ersheds is that household members 
who attended a CFUG meeting did not share what transpired at the meeting with the other 
household members. Furthermore executives reported that even those who did attend meetings 
were often unaware of what was going on. For example: 
 
“No, most of the CFUG members don’t know about [RCMFN]. We have been 
conducting the regular meetings, seminars, for informing about [RCMFN] but the 
members seem to be not serious on that matter. They list n very carefully while in 
seminar but if the same people were asked about [RCMFN] then they cannot answer the 
questions.”  
CFUG president 
 
CFUG members in both study sites also expressed that they were often distracted by concerns at 
home and found it difficult to focus on what was going on in meetings. All but one or two focus 
group participants from each focus group in both study sites reported that they often did not 
know the activities and issues in the CFUG beyond those associated with fodder and fuelwood 
harvesting regulations. For all of these reasons, most CFUG members in both study sites are 
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ambivalent and poorly informed about the RCMFN project. The following quotes are examples 
of lack of understanding and knowledge of the RCMFN project as expressed by CFUG 
members: 
 
“We have just heard about the name [of the RCMFN project] from the president and 
other staff in the meetings; we do not know about its activities. It may be smoke or dust.”  
CFUG focus group 
 
“We have heard about [RCMFN]. But we don’t know thedetails about it. To know about 
REDD+ clearly we must consult the president.” 
    CFUG focus group 
 
 One to two participants in each focus group reported that they were very involved in the 
CFUG.  These include executive members, council members, and people who said they aspire to 
one of those positions and they regularly attend CFUG meetings.  They have a limited 
understanding of the RCMFN project and typically know about one or more of the following 
benefits of the carbon payment program:  payments are m de to the CFUG for protecting the 
forest, payments are made because the forest traps gasses produced in developing countries, 
payment funds come from developed countries, the forest is measured and from those numbers 
the amount of carbon is calculated. However, the following quote demonstrates that even 
involved individuals have a limited understanding of the RCMFN project:  
 
“Not only the members [don’t know about RCMFN], even the top level executives are 
also not well informed about the [RCMFN] program.”  
CFUG president 
 
A pattern I found in my research is that only one or two people in each CFUG where I 
conducted interviews, usually the chairperson or the secretary, had an in depth understanding of 
the RCMFN project. These individuals could describe in detail the process of CFUG 
engagement, carbon measurement, payment allocation, why payments are made, and the basic 
facts about REDD+ operations at the national and international level. However, even 
knowledgeable CFUG executives do not know the source of RCMFN or future funding, and they 
have no understanding of the international guidelines surrounding REDD+.  
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I was initially unsure if this lack of awareness was problematic or if only a few 
knowledgeable people were required in each CF to make the project run well. CFUG executives 
and members I interviewed said it was important for members to know how the CFUG operates. 
Members need to understand CFUG harvesting guidelines a d social programs to properly 
participate in these programs. It is also important o know about these programs and general 
CFUG operations so members can effectively participate in the debate about CFUG operations. 
A CFUG executive made this point by saying: 
 
“It is very important for the CFUG members to understand how the REDD+ program 
works. Because if all the CFUG members protect the for st then it is possible to protect 
the forest and that’s why everyone needs to know about the REDD+ program.” 
CFUG President 
 
“It’s important that they know because if all CFUG members know the REDD+ program 
they won’t go to the CFUG to cut the trees and grass and the animals. It is important to 
understand not to cut the trees illegally.”  
 
   CFUG President 
 
Furthermore CFUG members report that informed participation is necessary for proper 
participation in the RCMFN project: 
 
“We can know many things about the forest and forest management activities. It is 
important to know about the harvesting regulations. The meetings are conducted to 
protect the forest and formulate different plans and policies for the benefit of the forest 
and the community. We can put our ideas and voices in the meeting. This can be useful to 
solve many problems that the people are facing currently.” 
   CFUG focus group 
 
If CFUG members do not understand the benefits of the RCMFN program and why it is 
important to reduce resource use and enhance protection of the forest, then they will not 
participate.  
 The key point to take away from this section is the importance of informing and engaging 
all CFUG members. When members were not informed and engaged concerning project 
participation they rejected the RCMFN project. Once the CFUG has agreed to participate, 
reliance by RCMFN on existing CFUG modes of information dispersal was inadequate to inform 
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most CFUG members about the project. Finally CFUG members and executives considered 
member knowledge about the RCMFN project or future REDD+ projects key to their success. 
 
Section summary: 
International rules requiring CFUGs to participate with the government overlook the 
often contentious relationship between CFUGs and the DoF. Disputes over the role of CFUGs in 
community development and proposals to increase DoF oversight into CFUGs have created 
mistrust between these organizations. I suggest that his mistrust makes it more challenging for 
the government to fulfill its role as carbon market facilitator and for the government and user 
groups to come to a consensus over carbon ownership. Unease among CFUG executives and 
members about government participation is exacerbatd by lack of information about the 
RCMFN project and REDD+ in general. CFUG executives and members in both watersheds see 
informed participation as critical for the success of the RCMFN project.  
 
Capacity of CFUGs to Participate in and Manage Tasks Required by REDD+ in an 
Effective and Equitable Manner 
Two issues that create obstacles for CFUG participaon in REDD+ are lack of technical 
skills needed for forest measurement and the costs and challenges related to CFUG participation 
in REDD+. Opportunities they will receive from participation include: CFUG willingness to 
invest in technical training, benefits CFUGs receive from participating in RCMFN /REDD+ and 
awareness of concepts of ecosystem services and CFUG good governance. 
 
Forest Measurement and Carbon Calculation: 
The CFUGs in this study lacked many of the skills and resources to complete current 
DoF administrative and silvicultural requirements required for participating in Nepal’s 
community forestry program. Thus I argue they are f from prepared to undertake additional 
measurements that will be required as part of REDD+. Some of the factors CFUG executives and 
members identified as constraining CFUG capacity were lack of financial resources, poor 
educational infrastructure, and outmigration. 
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Lack of financial resources: 
CFUG executives and members in my two study sites reported that when their CFUGs 
were first founded, many did not have the financial resources to pay for CFUG operations such 
as inventorying community forests or preparing accounting books and management plans. They 
relied completely on volunteer labor and did not have funds for community forest guards or a 
physical office, let alone an office administrator or basic office supplies. This lack of resources 
made it difficult to properly operate CFUGs.  In the study’s two watersheds, CFUG 
infrastructure has gradually improved. CFUGs have increasingly gained access to income from 
user fees, a variety of income generating activates, nd in some places timber sales, to pay for 
these basic services. However, even before the imple entation of the RCMFN project not all 
CFUGs had commercial quality timber to sell. Given the limited amount of income received 
from only user fees, they did not have sufficient income to hire labor, but this has changed with 
carbon funds. The following quotation from an annual CFUG meeting documents the importance 
of the increase in CFUG income:  
 
“Moreover, it even made us financially able to give salary to guards. Before, we had to 
depend upon trees to collect the money but now the presence of REDD+ increased our 
financial ability.” 
   CFUG president 
 
Educational infrastructure and outmigration: 
Many places, especially in rural Nepal where community forests exist lack quality 
schools, some CFUGs do not have access to formally educated members with requisite skills for 
administrative positions. For example, in both the Charnawati and Kayar Khola study sites, some 
of the CFUGs were in more remote areas and had no access to schools or only grammar schools. 
In one of the CFUGs in Kayar Kkhola, the president sta ed there were only about a dozen literate 
individuals out of approximately seventy-nine households in the CFUG.  
Migration to foreign countries and to cities for work had also depleted many CFUGs in 
my study area of working age people and formally educated individuals. The president of one of 
the smaller CFUGs in Charnawati reported that at present there were no working aged male 
residents living in the area full-time. She said they all worked outside the village.  The most 
formally educated people available to assume administrat ve tasks in a CFUG were female high 
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school graduates who were unmarried. Because these individuals lacked prior office 
management experience and were needed by their families for household chores, an older man 
and woman helped to undertake the administrative tasks of the CFUG and participated in the 
executive interview. The woman was a former secretary and he was a former president.  
A shortage of formally educated individuals for similar positions within CFUGs was 
most common in communities without any road access. However road accessibility was one of 
the criteria for choosing the RCMFN study sites so participating CFUGs were ones with relative 
accessibility compared to many parts of Nepal. Furthermore, Charnawati watershed was adjacent 
to the district headquarters, Charikot, and the Kayer Khola watershed was an hour and a half 
from Chitwan district headquarters, Narayangardh. This city is also well known for several good 
universities. There are many locations in Nepal that are much farther away from cities that have 
similar economic and educational opportunities thatcan keep educated individuals close to the 
home district. 
 
Current CFUG capacity: 
Under the Community Forestry Act, CFUGs are required to complete and submit annual 
reports to the district forest office and produce fiv  year operational plans; however, more than 
half of CFUG executives in my two study sites reported that their CFUG did not produce any 
annual reports before joining the RCMFN project. They said they lacked financial resources and 
administrative skills to complete these reports. For the past two years the RCMFN project has 
paid all the CFUGs in the project to complete their y arly reports. Current CFUG regulations 
also require a more in-depth, five year operational pl n that includes forest analysis based on 
silvicultural assessments. For these, CFUGs need District Forest Office assistance. Reporting 
under REDD+ is likely to be similar to these five yar reports, but the analysis required to 
calculate carbon sequestration is more specialized than the analysis in the five year plan and 
CFUG presidents worry that their user groups lack these needed skills to complete them. 
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Importantly, there is no baseline for understanding forest inventory and management operations 
at present or for tracking conditions under REDD+. The quote below demonstrates how 
dependent CFUGs are on NGOs for outside assistance: 
 
“We cannot do anything [in the RCMFN project] without the help of the NGO. If we 
have to do it without their help then we do not have the knowledge of the equipment and 
its use.” 
   CFUG president 
 
The RCMFN project’s training is limited to 2-3 members in each CFUG and the training 
only covers the basic components of forest measurement. CFUGs can choose whom to send to 
participate in training. The RCMFN training goal does not include a sample design for 
measuring forest resources and RCMFN does not provide equipment to conduct forest 
measurement surveys or to conduct soil and leaf litter carbon analysis. It is important to note that 
it is impractical for most CFUGs to learn sampling design, conduct soil carbon analysis and data 
analysis due to the need for specialized equipment and knowledge. All CFUG presidents I 
interviewed in Chanawati and Kayar Khola stated that t ey currently lack the ability to measure 
carbon without outside assistance but all expressed confidence they would be able to do so with 
more training. This impression was reported to me the following way: 
 
“At a nearby school, 2-3 people learned about measur ment at REDD+ plots in an 
adjacent CFUG. They learned about the tree, leaf litter, grass, and even mud 
measurement. That’s it. We don’t know how to calculate the carbon. If they organize 
training, we will participate.” 
   CFUG president 
 
The regional REDD+ coordinator in Kayar Khola suggested that one or possibly two CFUGs 
would have people capable of conducting forest measur ments independently by the end of 
2013. It is reasonable to assume that CFUGs can lear  the skills necessary to conduct forest 
measurement themselves, however, data and soil sample nalysis will require specialized 
expertise and equipment that cannot practically be obtained by each CFUG. 
 The key points to take away from this section are that CFUGs are not prepared to conduct 
even the most basic components of carbon measurement. Lack of financial resources, poor 
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educational infrastructure and outmigration are some f the identified challenges to CFUG 
capacity. 
 
Financial Costs and Challenges Related to Community Forest User Group Participation in 
RCMFN:  
 CFUG executives and members noted minimal cost to RCMFN participation, however, 
lacked the necessary information to assess program p ofitability. Furthermore CFUG executives 
and members have not assessed the potential costs of reduced resource use in exchange for 
carbon payments. 
Cost of participation: 
CFUG executives and members did not anticipate any direct costs, financial or otherwise, 
to participating in the RCMFN project. When asked about time required to participate in a 
carbon marketing system, they did raise concerns about the time requirements for additional 
office work; they also noted that forest measurement and regional RCMFN planning meetings 
took substantial amounts of time. However CFUG executives and members stated they 
considered these time requirements to be an acceptabl  p rt of investing in CFUG improvement. 
Concerns over time requirements were conveyed to me in this way: 
 
“Time needed to participate is the problem. There are other parts [of participating in 
REDD+] that require work but you have to work to improve your situation so that’s not a 
complaint but the time required [to participate in REDD+] we don’t like--time for office 
work, forest measurement and REDD+ [regional] meetings.” 
   CFUG president 
 
While most CFUG presidents noted that time requirements were a burden and that there was 
additional work related to participation, several members made the extra point that work was 
required to make improvements and that participation was worth the investment. 
 
CFUG member assessment of program profitability: 
CFUG executives and members in both watersheds do not have the information on cost 
of measurements, analysis and certification or the pot ntial price paid per ton of carbon. As a 
consequence they have no way to judge if the RCMFN project is economically feasible for them. 
RCMFN’s objective is to study the process of carbon payment implementation in their pilot 
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projects with a focus on equitable payment dispersal within CFUGs; they designed them to be 
without a cost for CFUGs. 
As a pilot project, RCMFN is designed to have no financial cost to participants; a few 
people will get paid and trained to help implement the project, and financial benefits will accrue 
to the CFUG (i.e., to their general fund). CFUG executives and members reported that they were 
unaware of the cost of implementing a project modele  after the RCMFN project. They 
understand that RCMFN is paying for this pilot project implementation.   
 
Decreased resource use: 
The RCMFN project encourages CFUGs to use fewer forst resources (e.g. fodder, 
fuelwood; timber) to increase carbon storage in their community forest and in turn receive larger 
carbon payments. At CFUG meetings, executives and RCMFN staff place significant emphasis 
on the importance of forest conservation, resource p otection and reduced resource use. The 
following quote supports this statement: 
 
“From the training we learn that we have to save our f rest at any cost. We have learned 
the idea [from RCMFN] to save the forest and its importance.” 
    CFUG president 
 
“We can harvest the same amount as before but we have been asked to only cut branches 
for fuelwood and not to do illegal cutting. Problems with using fewer resources depend 
on necessity; it is wise to use fewer resources from the forest and get more benefit from 
the forest however sometimes we need more resources and can’t use less.” 
   CFUG focus group 
 
Interviews with CFUG executives and members from both sites suggest that reduction in 
fuel wood, fodder and timber use are not occurring a d may not be feasible for CFUG members. 
More than half the CFUG executives and members report d using the same amounts of forest 
resources as they did before joining the RCMFN program. Some executives reported that 
members were reducing resource use from the community forest but when further questioned 
they noted that members had not reduced overall resou ce use; they had merely shifted the 
location (i.e. leakage) from where they obtained resources.  
For example, CFUG members in both study sites who rep rted harvesting fewer resources from 
the community forests such as fuelwood fodder and timber stated they had shifted where they 
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harvested some of their forests resources to places outside the community forest such as private 
land or government forests but had not reduced overall use.  
Furthermore, although CFUG members from both sites with the ability to shift resource 
extraction to other forest areas and reported doing so, CFUG members, especially poor or low 
cast individuals without access to private land or other forests stated they were unable to shift 
where they harvest resources. Executives stated that members of these two groups often do not 
attend CFUG meetings so they lack an understanding of the RCMFN program and the potential 
trade-offs that exist between resource use and financ al benefits from REDD+ participation. Low 
caste people (e.g. dalits) may also be unwilling or socially unable to voice th ir opinions in the 
CFUG meetings. In some locations in Nepal, this behavior is still socially prohibited.  
The key points to take away from this section are that CFUG executives and members see 
RCMFN as having few significant costs. However they do not have enough knowledge of how 
REDD+ works to assess post RCMFN participation costs, or potential program profitability. 
Furthermore the cost of reduced resource use in exchange for carbon sequestration payments has 
yet to be assessed and is likely to affect poor and low cast members most. 
 
Community Forest User Group Willingness to Invest in Technical Training: 
Some CFUG executives from both sites express a strong desire to participate in REDD+ 
programs without NGO or government involvement and this interest is accompanied by a 
willingness to learn the skills necessary to do so. CFUG executives reported that they want their 
CFUGs to conduct as much of the carbon measurement and analysis process themselves as 
possible, using a minimum number of outside experts. They have a goal of maintaining as much 
self-sufficiency and autonomy as possible while participating in REDD+ programs. Most CFUG 
executives repeatedly emphasized their desire for the CFUG to operate on its own and not be 
dependent on outsiders such as the DoF and international donors. This view was expressed the 
following way: 
 
“Yes we are interested [in measuring the forest ourselves] because this is our CFUG. If 
we know how to do it, why call other people. We want to learn about measurement 
including carbon measurement, we want to have direct dialog with the organization that 
gives the carbon. If they taught we could learn but it would be difficult to get the 
instruments (GPS/ Compass), It would be difficult because of the cost.”  
   CFUG president 
 
 
65 
 
 
While CFUGs can gain more knowledge about REDD+ programs and more skills related 
to forest measurement that will allow them to participate in a more independent fashion there are 
some aspects of the process such as soil carbon analysis that require specialized training and 
equipment that are not practical for every CFUG to possess. 
The prior condition and experience of community forests must be appreciated to 
understand constraints and opportunities related to REDD+. With respect to their desire to invest 
in training and achieve self sufficiency, CFUGs are influenced by their historical experiences 
where, after nationalization of forest resources residents did not have control over their local 
forest resources. With the advent of modern community forestry, the shift from no control to 
control and independent management is a central component of how CFUG staff describe the 
reason they embraced community forests and self management is the goal for the organization. 
This desire for independence explains the CFUG quest to acquire the technical capacity to 
conduct carbon measurement and analysis. This view was expressed as follows:  
 
“Before, if we needed the resource from the forest we had to go to the DFO but now we 
manage the forests and can go to the forest ourselves.” 
   CFUG president. 
 
 
The RCMFN program trains CFUG members to facilitate developing more expertise in 
the forest measurement component of the project. RCMFN’s training goal was to have each 
CFUG capable of measuring their own forest but this wa  not achieved under the initial three 
year life of the project and CFUG members were never provided the tools to conduct the surveys 
(e.g. GPS unit, measuring tape, compass and sextant). I  is unclear why RCMFN did not provide 
the tools and more training, but the desire for both was often expressed by CFUG executives. 
The project was extended for an additional two years so it is possible that the goal of technical 
self sufficiency will be met by that time. Teaching how to develop sample design and conduct 
data analysis is not a component of the project. For example, soil and organic carbon samples are 
taken in the field, but not analyzed locally. Instead they are sent to laboratories in Kathmandu for 
analysis. 
Three CFUG presidents, two from Kayar Khola and one from Charniwati, expressed a 
willingness to send members of their CFUG to Kathmandu and to pay for their training out of 
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community forest funds if necessary. They are uncertain about the cost to train someone to learn 
the skills necessary to conduct the measurements themselves but they estimate it would be cost 
effective if the program continued for a number of years. This was explained the following way: 
 
“I don’t think that it would be too costly for us if we have to do the measuring by 
ourselves. We will use the local resources and the manpower from the local community. 
And, we would even pay at the local price.”  
   CFUG president 
 
While most executives in both study sites did not share this view and stated that without 
the support of the RCMFN program they would not be a le to participate because they lacked the 
requisite skills and knowledge, there is evidence that if one CFUG in an area was able to acquire 
skills for independent measurement, the idea could spread. CFUG executives and users describe 
that they learned about many of the practices, programs and even the idea to create a CFUG from 
observing and learning about what other adjacent communities were doing. CFUG members 
described how they learned about community forestry in the following way: 
 
“The forest started to decrease rapidly, that’s why e started the community forest. We 
saw other community forests being established in other areas. Many people stated talking 
about the community forest and its benefits. We all were motivated by that.” 
   CFUG focus group 
  
 
While CFUG executives report self-sufficiency as very important, some executives from 
both study sites recognize a potential need for an intermediary organization for the sale of 
carbon, even if they can accomplish all the carbon measurement and analysis independently. 
However, they report that if they use an intermediary, they need to learn enough about the 
process to feel they are in a position to assess if that organization is being an honest broker. The 
CFUG executives report that if there was an organization they believed was transparent, they 
would consider partnering with them to sell carbon. 
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Even an organization such as FECOFUN, which is ostensibly a federation of about 14,000 of the 
approximately 18,000 CFUGs in Nepal, is not considere  completely trustworthy by many 
CFUG executives. A CFUG expressed this view by saying: 
  
“FECOFUN is OK but we have some doubt because we don’t know ourselves. We want 
to calculate ourselves so we know we are getting the money we deserve. We think direct 
dialog with the REDD+ program would be best. We think it might be OK to have an 
intermediary organization to work with because it would reduce overhead cost and it 
might be possible to have a transparent organization we could trust and we might need 
assistance to engage with the organization. But we would like to try and do it ourselves.”  
   CFUG president 
 
The CFUG executives from both study sites that exprssed interest in learning how to 
participate on their own or continuing to participate in REDD+ with the assistance of another 
partner organization after RCMFN stated that they wre unsure how to market carbon. When 
asked how they would proceed they said they would contact FECOFUN for help. 
CFUG executives and members from both watersheds stated a range of views on their 
willingness to invest in the technical training required to participate in REDD+. Some CFUG 
executives were willing to make all the investments themselves if necessary while others were 
only interested in participating in the training RCMFN offered. Despite these differences 
executives almost universally expressed a desire to gain as many skills as they could related to 
REDD+ and to have the CFUG conduct as much of the carbon measurement and analysis as 
possible.  
The key points to take away from this section are that CFUGs want to learn as much as 
possible about REDD+ and gain as many skills related to REDD+ participation so they can 
maintain as much independence as possible while partici ting in REDD+ programs. However, 
CFUGs do recognize the need for an outside facilitating organization to assist with participation. 
 
Benefits CFUGs Receive from Participating in the REDD+ RCMFN Program: 
I report the perceived financial and non-financial benefits that CFUG executives and 
members hope to obtain from participating in RCMFN.  
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Financial benefits: 
CFUG executives in both watersheds are interested in increasing revenue to pay for basic 
CFUG operations and community projects and recognize REDD+ as a potential new source of 
income. In contrast, CFUG members only noted the need for additional income to support local 
community development programs and would like to expand social benefits with the introduction 
of REDD+.  
CFUG executives in both study sites report that one of the main advantages of REDD+ is 
that it allows the CFUG to generate income from the for st without harvesting any resources. 
Executives noted that before RCMFN, CFUGs had to harvest resources from the forest, 
primarily timber to generate extra income. This was seen as potentially problematic because it 
affected the quality and abundance of other resources such as timber, fodder and ecosystem 
services (e.g. clean water; erosion control; fresh air). However, carbon payments are not equal to 
the value of timber and even one large tree of a high value species is worth more than almost all 
participating CFUGs received from the RCMFN program.  
CFUG executives and members repeatedly noted the valu of a well stocked forest with 
large trees for household access to fire wood and fod er and ecosystem services. Executives said 
that it was important but difficult to balance the b nefits of extra income generation from timber 
harvesting with the associated costs of reductions in fodder, fuelwood and ecosystem service 
quality. Carbon payments do not force communities to make these trade-offs. However, again, at 
present they do not offer the same financial payoff. Several communities receive over two 
million Nepali Rupees (NPR) ($25,000) from timber sale  while the highest any CFUG received 
from carbon payments was 430,000 NPR ($5,375). (RCMFN 2013)  
The Kayar Khola REDD+ project coordinator for RCMFN reported that before the 
RCMFN project came to the area, CFUG members felt that generating income and conserving 
the forest were incompatible activities and that now CFUGs know it is possible to generate 
income from conservation. An RCMFN staffer stated this in the following way: 
 
“[RCMFN] gave them the idea that money can be made from preserving the forest. 
Before REDD+, people thought they had to exploit the forest to get money. This is really 
big, before people thought management was a two sided coin--exploit and get money or 
not exploit get no money.” 
   RCMFN staff 
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Finally some of the CFUG executives in both watershd  reported that they would 
consider REDD+ participation financially beneficial even if the CFUG only broke even as long 
as a significant amount of the money spent on impleentation went to pay CFUG members for 
measurement and administrative costs. 
 
Non-financial benefits for conservation: 
CFUG executives and RCMFN staff recognize non-monetary benefits to carbon payment 
participation as well. These include increased CFUG member awareness in both sites regarding 
improved fuel wood and fodder harvesting practices, encouraging the use of fewer forest 
resources. Executives see these activates as leading to a  improvement in forest condition. 
CFUG executives from both sites report that CFUG memb rs are now harvesting more carefully 
when they collect fuelwood and fodder and that they try to limit the amount they harvest to only 
what they need. This point was expressed the following ay:   
 
“CFUG members go to the forest for the leaf litter and the fodder. They do not cut 
roughly. They use the scientific method to cut. (Staged thinning of saplings and of 
branches) Where there are dense trees or forest, thy can use forest products from there.” 
CFUG president 
 
CFUG executives in both sites believe that following these forest harvesting methods will 
lead to an improvement in forest health in the form f a denser well-stocked forest with 
improved environmental conditions and functions contributing to ecosystem services from the 
forest such as clean water, more water for irrigation, erosion control, and increased animal 
habitat in addition to climate change mitigation. 
 
“We get environmental balance from improving the forest. We need environmental 
balance to combat loss of species (birds), changes i  rain fall and changes in temperature.  
The monsoon is late and now there is no snow in winter with some rain.” 
CFUG president 
 
CFUG executives and members also recognize improving human and CFUG capacity as 
additional benefits. In almost every interview I conducted in both watersheds, CFUG executives 
and members expressed a need for improved administrative and silvicultural capacity. However, 
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the area of capacity they identify as the most in need for attention is community development 
planning. Most CFUGs have at least some funds to spend on community development and would 
like advice on how to best utilize that money. 
The key points to take away from this section are that CFUG executives and members see 
the financial payments from REDD+ participation as the main benefit of participation. 
Executives also felt that the ability to generate income from the forest without harvesting 
resources is a unique benefit of REDD+.  Finally executive and members users also note 
improved fodder and fuelwood harvesting practices, and administrative and silvicultural capacity 
as non-monetary benefits of participation. 
 
Ecosystem Services and Forest Conservation: 
REDD+ is an ecosystem service payment program that provides payments in exchange 
for conservation of forests. CFUG executive and memb r understanding of these ideas and 
willingness to participate in them will be essential to the success of REDD+ programs in 
community forestry. 
 
Awareness of ecosystem services: 
While REDD+ is new and not always fully understood by CFUG executives and 
members in both watersheds, they have a broad awareness of the value of more traditional 
ecosystem services such as: erosion control, clean air and water, cool air and sustained water 
throughout the year. CFUG members report that forest resources for household use and 
ecosystem services were viewed as more valuable than the monetary value of selling timber even 
before the advent of the RCMFN project. There is a keen sense of the importance of long-term 
forest health. CFUG executives and members almost uniformly report that services such as clean 
water and air were the most valuable products they received from the forests. This point was 
expressed in following way: 
 
 
“It [the forest] provides us fresh air, oxygen, and pure drinking water, increasing the 
source of water. When we started the CF we did not get enough water daily.” 
   CFUG focus group 
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“Fresh air and the fresh water I think is the most valuable thing we can get from the 
forest.” 
   CFUG president 
 
Basic household resources such as fodder and fuelwood ere also considered resources that 
CFUG members could not live without but not as fundamentally important to life as clean water 
and air. 
 
Forest conservation: 
CFUG members in both study sites have shown a willingness to invest in forest 
conservation in exchange for future benefits. This wa  most apparent during the early stages of 
establishing community forests when restrictions were placed on resource harvesting to help 
forests regenerate. Currently, most CFUG members report that they obtain more resources from 
the forest now than when they started better managing the forest. CFUG members initially 
shifted resource use to private land so that the decreased extraction from community forests 
would not cause a shortfall of household fuelwood or fodder. A few CFUG members reported 
that overall extraction of forest resources was higher before community forests were established, 
but that much of the biomass harvested earlier was taken by people living outside the 
communities that manage community forests. As such, the condition of forest was declining. 
These individuals all perceived the situation was better now with the advent of community 
forests which includes clear rules and enforcement for forest use as well as for providing some 
inputs into social programs by the CFUG. This was expr ssed the following way: 
 
“In the initial starting time there was no good forest but now it is good. We planted 
…trees and we thinned the forest. There was no goodforest but we thinned where it was 
dense. Also a rotational watching system was implemented. The watchers were members 
from each household. We also stopped the grazing. This was not a problem because we 
would go to the forest to cut the fodder in a discriminating way, not cutting the small 
trees. In the beginning we still took from the CFUG but we took more wisely, only taking 
the dead and dying tree. We used the fuelwood and fod er from our private land, and 
dead and dying trees from the forest and from the thinning. That is how they kept it from 
being a problem. We get more resources from the forest now. We get more [drinking and 
irrigation water] and because of the increase of the forest condition the water has 
increased. We get more of [Timber, fodder, and fuelwood]. “ 
   CFUG focus group 
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In both Charnawati and Kayar Khola, livestock grazing was prohibited in all of the 
community forests. This decision was made because und r their grazing regimes the animals 
foraged on shrubs and small trees and prevented forst regeneration. CFUG members in both 
study sites said this restriction was not a burden because now members obtain fodder from the 
forest and feed it to their animals in their stalls under what is called “stall-based cut and carry” 
livestock management. CFUG members I interviewed report that obtaining fodder is more work 
than allowing cattle to graze in the forest, but they perceive that the benefit of a healthy forest is 
far greater than the cost of the extra work. This may represent a gender bias however in that 
fodder harvest is often done by women, ultimately increasing their daily work load; hence, the 
burden is not felt or reported by men interviewed in this study. 
In all the study sites, CFUG executives and members reported forests recovered more 
rapidly than they had anticipated with the onset of community forest management. In some 
locations, forests were re-opened for use within two years. CFUG members and executives have 
shown that they both value and understand ecosystem services and resource conservation. 
 The key points to take away from this section are that CFUG executives and members 
recognize and value the ecosystem services they recive from the forest and are willing to invest 
in forest conservation to improve the ecosystem servic s they receive from the forest. Ecosystem 
service awareness and valuation, and willingness to invest in forest conservation are key 
components of REDD+ and awareness of these concepts by CFUG executives and members 
should make understanding REDD+ easier. Furthermore this suggests that CFUG executives and 
members values are aligned to a certain degree with REDD+’s goals and this should further 
facilitate CFUG participation.   
  
CFUGs as a Mechanism to Distribute REDD+ Payments: 
Members of CFUG user groups in both the study’s two key watersheds believe that 
CFUGs are a potentially effective mechanism to distribu e REDD+ payments. Almost all 
respondents felt the decision making process to be responsive in both places. The general feeling 
was that user groups practiced good governance and were receptive to the needs of CFUG 
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members suggesting that user groups are good institutions to distribute REDD+ funds. This view 
was expressed in the following way: 
 
“All the community members are asked in the annual meeting about the decision whether 
to invest in certain activities or not. On the basis of the priority and necessity the 
investment is made. In the meeting we can express our ideas and views properly.” 
CFUG focus group 
 
“When we have a certain desire for the investment of the money, at first the committee 
investigates about that necessity and tries to see if th money is sufficient for that 
investment or not and then only the committee calls the meeting for the further 
discussion. If our desires are more feasible, and for the benefit of the whole community, 
the committee tries to fulfill our needs and wants by making the investment in that area.” 
    CFUG focus group 
 
Furthermore, low income-generating community forests such as those in the Charniwati 
study site have relatively fixed budgets due to their limited financial resources; however, there is 
broad consensus on how funds should be invested. In Kayar Khola where CFUGs have much 
larger budgets there is more flexibility on how money should be spent and consequently more 
discussion about potential investments. Usually there was enough money to invest in all the areas 
that the community identified as priorities.  
 The key point to take away from this section is that CFUG members believe CFUGs 
generally practice good governance and can be an effective mechanism to distribute REDD+ 
payments. 
 
Section summary: 
 Lack of CFUG capacity to implement carbon measurement necessitates expensive 
outside expertise which both potentially reduces carbon payment profits and undermines CFUG 
autonomy and self-sufficiency. However, CFUG executives and members in both of the study’s 
focal watersheds reported that they believe they ar c pable of learning how to conduct forest 
measurements and are willing to invest limited community forest funds in the requisite training. 
The CFUGs in the study said they want to participate in carbon payment programs because they 
recognize potential CFUG financial benefits as well as those for improving the organization’s 
operational capacity and forest extraction methods. CFUG member awareness of forests for 
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ecosystem services provides a helpful framework for them to conceptualize carbon sequestration 
and the benefits they would receive on the ground as well as from healthy forests. Finally, 
member perceptions of CFUG good governance suggest they believe the CFUG is an appropriate 
mechanism for payment distribution.  
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CHAPTER 5.  DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter returns to the main question posed in the beginning of the study and uses the 
results to begin answering it. The main question is: What are the opportunities and constraints for 
community forest user groups to benefit from REDD+ participation? To examine these 
opportunities and constraints the study specifically evaluated: 1) how global carbon standards 
and the ongoing negotiations surrounding them offer opportunities and constraints for 
community forest user group participation in programs based on REDD+; 2) how each of the 
different actors -- CFUGs, NGOs and Nepali governmet employees -- view their roles within 
the development and operation of REDD+ programs in Nepal, and 3) the capacity of CFUGs to 
participate in and manage tasks required by REDD+ in an effective and equitable manner. The 
chapter is divided into five parts: the first three parts respond to these three dimensions by 
summarizing and interpreting key results, linking them back to the literature, and where 
appropriate, offering recommendations. Part four places the first three parts into their global 
context. Part five concludes the thesis by posing some remaining questions and offering 
suggestions on how the results may be useful to community forestry in Nepal and elsewhere in 
the world.   
 
Part 1: Opportunities and Constraints that Global Carbon Standards and the Ongoing 
Negotiations Surrounding Them Offer CFUG Participation in Programs Based on REDD+ 
Uncertainty about REDD+ and REDD+’s Future: 
  My research found that lack of consensus in international negotiations over REDD+’s 
institutional mechanisms and that Nepal is still establishing its own REDD+ implementation 
framework has left the DoF, NGOs, and CFUG executives and members unsure of how REDD+ 
will operate.  
Members of the government REDD+ cell and the NGO community who work on carbon 
payment participation are apprehensive about CFUG eligibility to receive carbon payments. 
They are concerned that CFUGs may not be eligible to participate in carbon payments because 
forests are already well managed and minimal opportunity exists for increases in carbon 
sequestration. Dahal and Banskota (2009) and Bushley and Khatri (2011) also report that CFUGs 
may not be eligible to participate in carbon payments because forests are already sustainably 
managed and there will be minimal incentive to carbon financers to pay CFUGs. These authors 
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and the people I interviewed interpreted existing REDD+ documents as not supporting payments 
for already restored forests, but these conclusions ignore the stated role of countries to participate 
in forming REDD+ policies and implementation guideln s.  
The RCMFN project is encouraging CFUGs to increase sequestration rates through 
changes in forest management and resource use. CFUGs would be eligible to receive carbon 
payments for additional sequestration that accrues from these changes but the ability of well 
managed CFUGs to increase sequestration is in question. 
CFUG executives and members are unaware of this apprehension associated with 
eligibility. They simply want to increase carbon sequ stration rates to receive payments. 
Unfortunately, because CFUGs already implemented forest restoration several years ago, many 
community forests have little scope for further increase in carbon sequestration. Further 
reduction in resource use is difficult to accomplish. Currently, CFUGs have placed more 
emphasis on existing management strategies (e.g. forest thinning, replanting, fire line 
maintenance) but have not introduced new practices o increase forest carbon. CFUG members 
and executives reported they had not decreased resourc  use because they need all the resources 
they are currently using to meet their daily requirements. In several interviews, CFUG executives 
and members reported that resource use in their community forests was reduced however this 
was only possible because they had shifted use to other areas (i.e. leakage), thus negating any 
overall carbon sequestration. Bleaney et al. (2009) note that sequestration resulting from change 
in management would be eligible for carbon payments bu  did not address if CFUGs are capable 
of reducing resource extraction or implementing new management techniques without impinging 
member resource needs. 
Challenges to decrease resource use and to make furth r management changes strongly 
suggest that CFUG efforts to increase sequestration may be very limited.  These findings lead me 
to conclude that under current interpretations of REDD+ policy, CFUGs will have difficulty 
increasing sequestration rates and thus receive minimal or no payments. To address this issue, 
the DoF should increase efforts to lobby for a change i  REDD+ rules to allow past 
improvements in forest management to be eligible for carbon payments. This means that Nepal 
could set its carbon baseline at a date just prior to the onset of community forestry. If this 
negotiation is successful, Nepal’s community forests will be eligible for carbon payments 
without needing to make any changes in current forest management. Nepal is not the only nation 
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that would benefit from this strategy and it is realistic to argue that Nepal can work with other 
countries to lobby for this rule change. The international financers are concerned that making 
payments based on past improvements in management is no the best use of the limited pool of 
REDD+ financing but that is not a worry for Nepal. Nepal should try to gain as much benefit out 
of the program as they can possibly achieve. 
I also discovered CFUG executive and member uncertainty round how a national 
REDD+ program will operate and when it will go into effect has left them cautious about 
investing in REDD+ preparedness. CFUGs believe theycan increase the payments they are 
receiving from the RCMFN project by improving forest management and resource conservation; 
however, they are aware it is only funded through the end of 2013. Furthermore because users 
have observed many previous short term development projects they are wary of investing time 
into learning about what they perceive to be another new program with an unknown future.  
    In support of my findings, Alvarado & Wertz-Kanounnikoff (2007), Angelsen (2008), 
FoEI (2008) and Densham et al. (2009) report that details on how different aspects of REDD+ 
will operate have not been finalized. They specifically identified the following as important 
unknowns: CFUG eligibility, carbon baseline calculations, measurement and verification of 
carbon stocks, and techniques to conduct monitoring and verification. Bleaney et al. (2009) add 
to this observation by stating that this uncertainty has left DoF and NGO staff unsure of how to 
move forward with REDD+ implementation or if the investments will be worthwhile. CFUG 
executive and member concerns are not addressed in the literature but they are similar to those 
expressed by the DoF and NGO members.  
The DoF is also concerned that resolving the issues around implementation and executing 
their solutions will take another ten years. This situation creates apprehension that the REDD+ 
program may never come to fruition in Nepal. In support of my findings, Angelsen et al. (2012) 
and Hansen et al. (2009) report that resolving complexities with REDD+ implementation will be 
difficult and time consuming. 
While uncertainty about the regulations around carbon measurement and verification are 
causing apprehension in Nepal and slowing implementation, this situation should also be viewed 
as an opportunity for Nepal to advocate for rules that will work best in Nepal. The DoF, NGOs 
and CFUGs should take this time to investigate strategies that allow CFUGs to participate in 
REDD+ that take into account challenges specific to CFUG and Nepal. Then the DoF should 
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advocate for these rules. It might even be advantageous to argue for special REDD+ rules for 
CFUGs that recognize their unique advantages: democratic structures that allow for payments 
directly to forest uses, diverse forest management stra egies that will prevent forests from being 
exclusively managed for carbon, poverty alleviation programs and ability to deliver ecosystem 
services to CFUG members.  
Despite concerns, CFUG executives and members, and DoF staff recognize that REDD+ 
participation is low risk because it promotes forest conservation. Stakeholders stated that, even in 
the worst case scenario (i.e. REDD+ provides no payments), community forest user groups will 
still be left with healthy forests. This perceived lack of risk, combined with outside funding (e.g. 
FCPF; other international agencies) to develop natio l REDD+ policies and conduct training, 
has led these groups to continue to push ahead with preparedness. My study is the first to identify 
that CFUG executives and members perceive REDD+ involvement to be low risk because it will 
not negatively affect forest condition.  
While CFUGs are not aware of all the concerns raised above, they recognize many of 
them and are still interested in participating. This suggests that if CFUGs are properly informed 
about REDD+, including potential concerns, they will still be interested in participating because 
of the need for increased income and technical ability they believe they can get from 
participating in REDD+.  
 
CFUG Requirement to Work with the Government: 
The UN-REDD Program and the FCPF mandate that REDD+ funding will be channeled 
through national governments (UN-REDD Program 2010; FCPF 2010). My interview results 
determined that CFUG members and executives desire to work directly with international carbon 
financers to avoid the appropriation of carbon funds by the government. They are also concerned 
that misuse of funds will occur if national NGOs act s facilitators. Corruption and instability in 
the Nepali government, due in part to the civil war in the mid-2000s as well as current failures to 
draft a new constitution, have made CFUGs wary of wrking with the government. Despite 
widespread opposition among CFUG executives and members to the concept of financial 
intermediaries, they do recognize the need for assistance to facilitate the sale of carbon. 
Executives and members find the idea of outside help acceptable if transparency and 
accountability can be insured. Furthermore I documented that DoF staff believe that despite 
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opposition to the government’s role in REDD+, it is unlikely to change because it guarantees the 
DoF control over the program and its funding.  
My findings regarding CFUG distrust of government control are supported by Peskett et 
al. (2010) who report that the international requirement that REDD+ payments be funneled 
through the government is problematic for program participation. These authors emphasize that 
this issue exists because many developing countries have weak institutional capacity and poor 
records of good governance. CFUGs are opposed to government control of the REDD+ funds for 
two reasons: 1) the government will keep most or all of the money and 2) the DoF will hold 
more power over CFUGs through access to this money. The DoF argues that it needs to keep 
some of the carbon payments to finance program imple entation. CFUGs and their supporting 
NGOs need to negotiate with the DoF to set the percentage of the money they take for program 
administration as low as possible. Furthermore theyneed to advocate for rules that give CFUGs 
control over how they can use the money. 
In addition to concerns with REDD+ facilitation, I learned that CFUG executives also 
consider requirements for professional accounting standards and the use of bank accounts to be 
restrictive. These regulations create barriers to some CFUGs, particularly those that do not carry 
a bank account, have access to a bank or pay for professional accounting. However CFUG 
executives also expressed a strong desire to build CFUG capacity and the requirements to meet 
financial standards necessary to participate in REDD+ may persuade CFUGs to address these 
issues. Lack of professional accounting and poor record keeping within CFUGs are not directly 
addressed in discussions of REDD+ participation but Kanel (2006) reports that it is a current 
challenge for CFUGs. 
The FCPF states that its funding is intended to help build capacity in the governments of 
participant nations (FCPF 2010). In Nepal this funding is being channeled through the DoF. I 
found that some DoF and NGO members discussed the po ential FCPF funding has to address 
longstanding issues within community forestry as well as those directly related to REDD+ 
participation but there is no official plan to encourage this approach. Long standing issues within 
community forestry, such as lack of technical capacity at the DoF and CFUG level, and need for 
improved governance and equitable resource distribution are problematic, but if some are 
addressed for the sake of carbon market participation, community forestry will likely improve 
more broadly in Nepal. In support of my results, Dahal and Banskota (2009) also recognize the 
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potential for REDD+ funding to help alleviate systemic issues in community forestry but they do 
not specifically address how this would be accomplished. 
To address these challenges The DoF, NGOs and CFUGs should work together to 
determine which investments need to be made in the DoF and CFUG to prepare them to be able 
to participate in REDD+ and how these investments can also benefit other aspects of community 
forestry.  
 
Part 2: View of Each Actor’s (CFUGs, NGOs, Nepali Government Employees) Role within 
the Development and Operation of REDD+ Programs in Nepal 
DoF and CFUG Conflict: 
 My research documented that despite establishment of community forestry on the basis of 
promoting improvements in forests and the wellbeing of local communities, conflict is occurring 
among the DoF, CFUGs and their supporting NGOs overwhich objective shall take priority. Not 
surprisingly, the DoF is mostly concerned with forest conditions. CFUGs, on the other hand, 
value the condition of the forest and the financial resources it provides that can help improve 
social and economic conditions. The connection betwe n people and forests is the founding 
concern in community forestry in Nepal and around the world. However, this relationship 
remains tenuous for many forestry departments. Furthermore if the DoF continues to seek a 
larger share of revenue from CFUGs, another new policy directive of community forestry in 
Nepal and elsewhere, they will undermine the attractiveness of REDD+ and community forestry 
to local people. This is because CFUGs are concerned that the DoF will increase taxation and 
oversight over community forest management. My research found that such proposals are being 
discussed and introduced as recently as 2012. These efforts, however, are strongly opposed by 
CFUGs and national level community forestry NGOs.  
The conflict between DoF and CFUGs on CFUG participation in REDD+ are very 
important limitations to REDD+. DoF effort to control REDD+ financing and to increase 
management over community forests creates mistrust between CFUGs and the DoF, and hinders 
solution to issues that directly and indirectly affect REDD+ participation such as carbon 
ownership and modernization of the laws governing community forestry. Studies by Thoms 
(2008) and Kanel (2006) also discuss the conflict between community forestry groups and the 
forestry department. Paudel et al. (2012), and Dahal nd Banskota (2009) also documented DoF 
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efforts to increase CFUG taxation and oversight. This conflict led me to conclude that CFUGs 
should be wary of the DoF controlling REDD+ funding because the DoF may attempt to put 
extra restrictions on how the REDD+ money can be used and they may try to acquire more of the 
REDD+ money than needed to implement the program. Furthermore, these concerns show there 
is a lack of trust on the part of the DoF in CFUGs. The DoF does not trust that CFUGs will 
invest its money in ways that will be best for the forest. They are concerned they will invest all 
of their money in community projects and not in forest conservation. From my interviews I 
found this to be untrue. CFUG executives and members expressed that they wanted to maximize 
the benefits they could obtain from the forest but not at the cost of damaging the forest because 
then it would no longer meet their needs. If the DoF d es not let CFUGs operate independently 
then they will never be able to do so, and it is unlikely that they will be able to participate 
independently in REDD+. The DoF certainly has a role t  play as an advisory and oversight 
organization but their authority over CFUGs should be limited to this. However, understanding 
REDD+ in light of the history of community forestry in Nepal suggests the DoF is not likely to 
relinquish its control, especially if the program were to become a large source of income. 
 
CFUG Executive and User Engagement and Understanding of REDD+ and RCMFN: 
Another set of issues which restricted CFUGs acceptance of the RCMFN project had to 
do with lack of RCMFN engagement with the full CFUG membership.  This limitation was 
particularly problematic in Charniwati because RCMFN initially engaged only with CFUG 
leaders and relied exclusively on them to introduce the RCMFN project. CFUG members, as a 
result, lacked understanding of the overall project and were not willing to invest in it.  This 
suggests the importance of engaging all CFUG members when introducing new programs and 
that good communication by the government and NGOs supporting REDD+ implementation 
could be essential. Furthermore RCMFN’s reliance on informal networks and methods for 
distribution of information and announcements at CFUG meetings is not adequate to produce 
fully informed participation. I found that half of CFUG members had never heard of REDD+ or 
RCMFN and that most of those that had, only knew a few basic details about them. My 
observation that lack of users awareness is a major issue that will hinder implementation of 
REDD+ is also emphasized by Bleaney et al. (2009) and Purnomo et al. (2012) who note that 
properly informed stakeholders were a necessary preequisite to participation in REDD+. 
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Part 3: Capacity of CFUGs to Participate in and Manage Tasks Required by REDD+ in an 
Effective and Equitable Manner 
Forest Measurement and Carbon Calculation: 
 My interviews revealed that CFUGs in my two study sites lack the technical skills to 
conduct forest measurement and the knowledge on how to calculate carbon sequestration rates 
even after two years of training. They want to develop these skills to be in control and fully 
participating in REDD+.   CFUG executives also feel that they will eventually be able to 
measure the forest independently with additional training. Furthermore, CFUGs lack the 
equipment necessary to conduct forest measurements and are also concerned about equipment 
cost. Broader structural issues in society such as lack of skilled or educated labor due to poor 
educational infrastructure and outmigration were also identified by CFUG executives as partially 
responsible for low capacity of CFUGs. Seddon et al. (2002) and Kanel (2006) also report on the 
insufficient technical knowledge of CFUGs as a hindra ce to REDD+ implementation. Earlier 
studies by Kanel (2006), Dahal and Banskota (2009) and Bushley and Khatri (2011) support my 
conclusion that most CFUGs do not have the skills or analytical capacity required to measure the 
forest and calculate carbon sequestration rates. In the future a more rigorous educational 
component or robust facilitation by NGOs is needed to train users to measure the forest. Despite 
these challenges of lack of CFUG capacity, access to killed labor and equipment, I concluded 
that CFUG executives had a strong desire to invest in the necessary training required for 
participation in carbon payment programs.   
 
Community Forest User Group Willingness to Invest in Training:  
I discovered that CFUG executives and users see their CFUG as an independent 
governance organization that is continually struggling to maintain its independence from the 
DoF. Due to their desire for operational autonomy, CFUGs seek to conduct as much of the forest 
measurement and analysis as possible independently from the government and NGOs. CFUGs 
are also willing to invest their own resources in co ducting the necessary training. The national 
REDD+ program should capitalize on the strong desire by CFUGs to have greater control in 
conducting the program. Muñoz-Pina et al. (2008) and Hufty & Haakenstad (2011) also 
emphasize that lack of local level involvement may exacerbate program constraints. 
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 Furthermore, cost of REDD+ implementation is a concer  and a national REDD+ 
program should make the most of CFUG desire to use local labor to reduce the cost of carbon 
measurement and verification. An added benefit is that those expenses would be paid to 
community members as opposed to outside experts. Even if program implementation is costly, 
that money will still become a source of income for local community members. I was not able to 
find any mention in the literature of CFUG interest in conducting their own independent carbon 
measurement and analyses, however, Dahal & Banskota (2009) confirm CFUG perceptions that 
the use of local labor is a good way to reduce overhead costs of REDD+ participation. 
It is important to note that even after two years of participation in the RCMFN project, no 
CFUG interviewed reported that they could measure the forest independently. However there 
was still a desire on the part of CFUGs to learn more and a feeling that they could eventually 
participate independently. It is concerning that even after this long time period, CFUGs cannot 
even conduct forest measurements. While some CFUGs lack formally educated individuals, 
many do not, so lack of educated individuals cannot be the only issue. Furthermore in the 
thousands of members of all the CFUGs participating in RCMFN, there are clearly many 
individuals with the motivation and ability to master he skills required to conduct forest 
measurements in two years. The only reasonable conclusion is that the training program 
developed by RCMFN requires improvement.  
  
Costs Related to Community Forest User Group Participa ion in REDD+: 
 CFUG executives and members are unsure about the futur  profitability of REDD+ 
participation because they do not know the cost of equipment, measurement, and analysis. CFUG 
participation in the RCMFN project, which is an approximation of an envisioned national 
REDD+ program, is designed to have no financial cost to users and was not intended to test the 
cost effectiveness of its methodology for REDD+ participation. Due to this limitation, CFUG 
executives and members do not have the necessary info mation to assess actual costs of 
involvement 
One of the premises of the RCMFN project is that CFUG members can reduce resource 
use, and that carbon sequestration will increase as a re ult of resource reduction. I found that 
some CFUG members do not have access to alternative sources of forest products outside their 
community forest and that most members have, at best, a poor understanding of the RCMFN 
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project. CFUG member ability to assess the cost of hifting or reducing resource use in exchange 
for financial payments is likely limited without a full understanding of the RCMFN project. 
Limited management changes and lack of resource use reduction suggest that payments may be 
minimal and unable to offset participation costs. Most importantly, if RCMFN or any REDD+ 
effort means CFUG lose their community forest as a source of meeting household forest product 
needs, they are not likely to enlist local support in their programs. 
Bleaney et al. (2009) complement my results by emphasizing how uncertainty around 
how REDD+ will operate at the national level and concerns about the cost of participation for 
CFUGs is a key but unresolved issue due to the preliminary stages of REDD+ development in 
Nepal. Furthermore Graham (2012) notes that REDD+ may threaten access by local people to 
forest resources and Kanel and Kandel (2004) raises concerns about overly protectionist CFUG 
management needlessly limiting member access to forest resources. 
 A future national REDD+ program will need to ensure that the costs of program 
participation are determined before it is introduced to CFUGs and that CFUGs are fully informed 
about what participation in REDD+ involves so they can make fully informed decisions about 
whether participation will benefit their CFUG. 
 
Benefits Community Forest User Groups Receive from Participating in REDD+ and RCMFN: 
CFUG executives and members reported that income gen ration such as training and 
capacity building to be benefits of participation in carbon payment programs. My results support 
the work of Huftey & Haakenstad (2011), Peskett et al. (2010) and Dahal & Banskota (2009) 
who all confirmed that these were potential benefits from participating in REDD+.  
In contrast to Peskett et al. (2010) and Dahal & Banskota (2009) whose work lacked 
specificity about potential non-monetary benefits, I discovered that CFUG executives had very 
explicit ideas about the nature of these benefits. Executives saw the re-focusing of member 
attention on the importance of good forest management as a significant benefit; they reported 
that members were harvesting more carefully and that many of them had increased awareness of 
the importance of conservative resource use. Furthermor , increased silvicultural capacity from 
improved forest measurement as well as acquisition of new management skills and techniques 
were also identified as benefits from participation in REDD+. 
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A future national REDD+ program should try to ensure that the skills that CFUGs gain 
associated with REDD+ participation are also applicable to other areas of community forestry. 
This may mean expanding some of the training to cover subjects that are related to general 
CFUGs needs but not directly related to REDD+. This will insure that CFUG get even more 
benefit out of participation and that REDD+ can also help other areas of community forestry. 
Furthermore, as others have shown (Peskett et al. 2010, Dahal & Banskota 2009), local 
forestry groups value the potential to earn extra income from forest conservation.  REDD+ 
potentially enables them to conserve their forest without having to face the negative trade offs 
related to timber extraction.  For REDD+ to be successful CFUGs need to recognize a benefit 
from participation. One of the primary benefits found in my study is the ability of carbon 
payments to fund social welfare programs.  DoF restriction on allocation of CFUG income for 
social welfare should be noted as a potential disincentive for CFUG participation and a 
compromise reached.  It suggests again the problem of DoF not willing to lessen control of 
community forestry user groups. 
  
Awareness of Ecosystem Services: 
CFUG executives and users identified several ecosystem ervices, such as clean air and 
water, as the most important non-monetary benefits they receive from the forest. They reported 
that it is good to protect the forest because a healthy forest produces quality ecosystem services 
and that it was worth using fewer resources, to a certain degree, to improve these services. 
Furthermore, generating income from the forest, withou  degrading the services it provides, is 
recognized as a benefit of the RCMFN project. Huftey and Haakenstad (2011) also reported 
improvement in ecosystem services as a co-benefit of REDD+, however they did not discuss 
whether REDD+ participants will see this as a signif cant benefit. The ability to generate income 
without degrading the forest should be a primary selling point of REDD+ participation. 
Furthermore benefits from forest conservation in the form of ecosystem service improvement 
should also be used to recruit CFUGs into a national REDD+ project. 
 
Good CFUG Governance: 
 I found that CFUG executives and members in both of e case study watersheds are 
concerned that some or all of REDD+ payments will be siphoned off by the DoF before they 
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have access to them. Fritzen (2007) and Huftey and Haakenstad (2011) also questioned whether 
REDD+ payments will reach the local communities that depend on the forest and are most 
affected by management changes related to REDD+. While they were concerned about REDD+ 
payments reaching the community level they felt thaif they did, they would be used 
appropriately. CFUG members identified mechanisms in place within their CFUG to decide how 
their income is used in a manner responsive to their needs and the broader community; they also 
noted that historically their user group funds have be n fairly dispersed. While CFUG members 
approved of this general process they noted that attendance at CFUG meeting and knowledge 
about CFUG activities, actions and decisions was necessary to monitor how financial resources 
were used.   
In contrast, Cotula (2009), (Thoms 2008) and Dahal & Banskota (2009) documented elite 
capture of resources and finances in CFUGs in Nepal and identify REDD+ funding as another 
potential source for corruption. The disparity betwen member perceptions of good governance 
and the literature may originate from the often hidden nature of elite capture. Thoms (2008) 
notes that social welfare programs or timber subsidie  that are open to any member of the CFUG 
but require substantial capital on the part of the participant can only be take advantage of by 
wealthy CFUG members. 
 
Part 4: Nepal’s Experience with REDD+ Relative to Other Nations 
To assess Nepal’s experience with REDD+ relative to the global context I examined 
Lawlor et al. (2013) analysis of over forty one REDD+ projects across twenty two countries; 
eight projects were in Asia, fourteen in Africa and nineteen in South and Central America. These 
projects were chosen because they were certified by the Climate, Community, and Biodiversity 
(CCB) Alliance. The CCB is a partnership of NGOs that promotes land management activities to 
mitigate climate change and improve local people’s lives. REDD+ projects that are certified by 
the CCB are required to report on local peoples participation and benefits from these projects in a 
systematic way. This allowed the researchers to conduct comparative analysis between and 
among projects. Their findings in relation to community benefits from REDD+, and engagement 
and education about REDD+ and project design generally support my findings and other existing 
research, (Bushley and Khatri 2011)  that education and engagement of local people are lacking 
in REDD+ project and that there are still questions surrounding the overall benefit of REDD+ 
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projects. In contrast their findings on tenure security contradict my results and other existing 
research (Dahal & Banskota 2009) that mostly raise concerns about potential negative effects 
REDD+ may have on tenure security. 
In contrast to the concerns I identified about tenur  security, Lawlor et al. (2013) review 
of REDD+ projects found that they had not weakened tenure security; in some cases, they 
strengthened it. Lawler and colleagues were able to discern a project’s effect on tenure in forty of 
the forty one projects in the study. In addition there was evidence for improvement in tenure 
security in twelve of those projects. Furthermore th y found that improvements mostly occurred 
in places that had week existing tenure rights. The main factor they used to gage tenure strength 
was whether the government maintained ownership of the land. This study would have likely 
classified Nepali community forests as having weak tenure despite some of the inherent 
advantages Nepal has relative to other community forestry systems in Asia, such as strong 
political support and well established legal framework. This seems to bode well for Nepal, 
however the exact factors that led to this improved tenure condition were not discussed. 
Similar to what I found in Nepal, Lawlor et al. (2013) reported that while many of the 
projects stated they educated people about REDD+ and involved them in the process of project 
development, there was little evidence that most local people had an adequate understanding of 
the different programs. This is similar to what hasppened in Nepal; although the REDD+ and 
the RCMFN project have been explained to CFUG executives and members, only a few 
individuals understand how REDD+ and RCMFN work.  
Awono et al. (2013) and Sunderlin and Sills (2012) noted that due to uncertainty about 
international REDD+ policy and carbon markets, REDD+ projects often delayed fully informing 
participants about REDD+ or did not share project plans to avoid raising expectations too high 
for participants. This situation is also similar to that found in Nepal where the uncertainty around 
REDD+ had not been conveyed to any CFUG executives or member I interviewed. Lawlor et al. 
(2013), Awono et al. (2013) and Sunderlin and Sills (2012) do not address whether the projects 
they analyzed made participants aware of all of the uncertainties around REDD+ but this is 
unlikely given that the biggest reasons that international REDD+ policy and REDD+ projects can 
be so challenging to understand is due to issues related to uncertainty. Reticence of RCMFN and 
other REDD+ based project staff at addressing these issu s is understandable however it leaves 
local people uninformed about issues that could cause them problems in the future. Furthermore 
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failure to share information makes the implicit assumptions that project staff members are 
capable of understanding these complexities but local people are not. From my research I found 
that CFUG executives were willing to take risks and make investments to improve their 
community forest and the user group. Local people should be fully informed about these 
uncertainties and many will still be willing to participate in these types of programs despite these 
concerns.  
 For many of the projects in Lawlor et al. (2013) review it is too early to assess whether 
they have produced material benefits. There was evidence in half of the projects for some direct 
benefits in the form of income, jobs or in-kind contributions for local populations. However 
advantages were deemed only modest. These results were similar to those that I found in Nepal. 
All of the CFUGs participating in RCMFN had received benefits in the form of cash payments 
and jobs but they were still unsure if the gains of participating in REDD+ would ultimately 
outweigh the costs. Lawlor et al. (2013) conclusion seem to shed some doubt on the hopes of 
NGOs, government and CFUGs to significantly increase CFUG income from REDD+ payments.  
However, even modest financial benefits were considere  attractive by CFUG executives. 
Overall, Lawlor’s review of this diverse group of projects is encouraging for the future of REDD 
in Nepal. 
 REDD+ is new to Nepal and a national REDD+ implementation strategy is still under 
development.  However strong lessons are beginning to emerge that are both similar and 
different to what is occurring globally. There is no evidence that REDD+ participation will 
improve tenure security for community forests in Nepal in comparison to what has been reported 
in other locations outside the country where participation in REDD+ programs has strengthened 
local people’s land rights. In contrast, Nepal’s exp rience with educating and engaging local 
people seems to mirror what is occurring in other countries but significant doubt exists as to how 
well informed and engaged most people have become. Lik  in Nepal, evidence from elsewhere 
demonstrates local people are receiving material advantages from REDD+ participation however  
their range of benefits is wider and the ultimate gains communities will receive is still uncertain.  
 
Part 5: Conclusions 
Climate change appears to be the greatest challenge of this century. REDD+ programs 
provide payments in exchange for increased forest conservation with the goal of reducing carbon 
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emissions from forest destruction and degradation. REDD+ recognizes that durable conservation 
gains cannot be met at the expense of local forest users, many of whom depend on forest 
resources for their daily survival. This is both a progressive goal and also a necessity. 
REDD+ theoretically takes the needs of local people into consideration but former 
programs, similar to REDD+, that have been designed at the international level, have had great 
difficulty delivering on this ideal. REDD+ states that nations have the flexibility to tailor national 
implementation strategies to local conditions however there is pressure to conform to 
international standards that are easily comparable mong nations. Furthermore, national level 
implementers in Nepal, who have also noted the importance of local participation in program 
design, have held most planning meetings in Kathmandu and made minimal efforts to engage 
CFUGs in rural regions of Nepal.  
Forest user engagement in REDD+ design is crucial because these programs are being 
implemented in diverse locations with their own unique histories, peoples and ecological 
conditions. The structural institutions around community forestry provide many advantages for 
REDD+ implementation in Nepal; however, these structures bring their own challenges such as 
the fact that the government retains ownership overCFUG lands and has the final say over forest 
management. Government control over REDD+ program design and payments will likely 
exacerbate these challenges considering the centralized nature of REDD+ administration and the 
need for technical forestry knowledge to conduct carbon monitoring and verification. The 
potential value of REDD+ payments is further cause for concern given previous DoF attempts at 
forest resource re-appropriation.  
As tenuous as Nepal’s CFUG rights are, user groups still have more legal security than 
many forest users around the world. Furthermore, about one third of the Nepalese are members 
of CFUGs giving them significant political clout. For these reasons, Nepal is an ideal test bed for 
REDD+.  However, even with these advantages, REDD+ presents significant challenges for 
CFUGs. In places where tenure rights are less secure and forest dependent people have reduced 
political power, REDD+ may represent more of a threat than an opportunity, especially if 
potential carbon payments prove to be lucrative. 
Lack of DoF effort to engage CFUGs about REDD+ suggests that CFUGs need to lead 
that process themselves. To influence international REDD+ structures and guidelines and to 
influence how REDD+ should be implemented in Nepal, FECOFUN and CFUG presidents 
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participating in RCMFN need to work together to create a list of recommendations for these 
organizations. Nepali CFUGs and FECOFUN should push for measurement and verification 
structures that are centered around CFUGs and involve the development of skills required to 
conduct these activities at the CFUG level. FECOFUN and CFUG presidents should then meet 
with REDD Cell personnel to advocate the REDD Cell to take these suggestions into account 
when developing its national REDD+ program. They should also encourage the government to 
advocate for these ideas at future COP-20 meetings. It is also important that FECOFUN and 
some of the CFUG presidents travel to the next COP meeting, COP-20. FECOFUN should work 
with other national and international organizations that promote local forest user rights. The 
CFUG president’s role should be to provide first hand testimonials in support of their 
recommendations. 
It is crucial for this engagement to take place because many CFUGs will be ineligible to 
receive payments if carbon payment eligibility is not expanded. Many community forests in 
Nepal have invested decades of hard work into building up and maintaining healthy forests and 
the emphasis that developed nations have placed on turni g REDD+ into the most efficient 
economic mechanism possible is likely to leave many of these users groups out of the process. 
From some economists perspectives, it is inefficient to pay “good behaving” CFUGs to do what 
they are already doing. However, this view is not equitable as it rewards those that have 
practiced “bad behavior.” Furthermore it does not acknowledge the benefits that these CFUGs 
have provided in the past. For example, a community forest that has been sequestering carbon for 
10-20 years has been providing a valuable global service through climate mitigation and they 
deserve to benefit from REDD+ programs and payments more than locations that have not 
practiced good conservation.  It is also inequitable to limit CFUGs to the funds they can receive 
for carbon payments because they have already made good decisions about forest management. 
While there are sound economic reasons for focusing on forests that can produce the most gains 
in relation to carbon sequestration and decreases in CO2 emissions, they fail to deliver on moral 
grounds and do not recognize the need to protect existing gains in forest conservation. 
Success of community forestry in Nepal is often credited to the fact that, while 
incomplete, it did devolve forest management to local people; these individuals took ownership 
of forest management once they had these rights and relatively quickly saw tangible benefits 
 
 
91 
 
from this change. This history suggests that if loca  people are given control over participation in 
REDD+, and receive benefits from participation, the program will succeed. 
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